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Security on Admiralty Counterclaims - A Search for
Solutions*
Alfred S. Pelaez**
INTRODUCTION

The 1966 unification of admiralty and civil procedures was made
possible only by the creation of special provisions applicable to the
more unique facets of the former admiralty practice. These provisions, entitled "Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and
Maritime Claims", are appended to and made a part of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. I have previously commented'at length on
several of the Supplemental Rules in Volume 7A, J. Moore and A.
Pelaez, FederalPractice.What follows are a few comments on Supplemental Rule E(7). This Rule is unique in that it compels a plaintiff proceeding in rem or quasi in rem to post sufficient security to
cover counterclaims that are asserted against him, and further provides that a failure to post such security may justify staying the
original suit.' No other plaintiffs can be subjected to such a requirement. In incorporating this provision in the unified civil rules, the
Advisory Committee states only that it is derived from former Supreme Court Admiralty Rule 50.2 However, the current Rule *

This article will ultimately appear in 7A J. MooRE & A.
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PELAEZ, FEDERAL PRACTICE (2d
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** A.B., LL.B., University of Pittsburgh; LL.M., Yale University; Professor of Law, Duquesne University.
1. 7A J. MOORE & A. PELAz, FEDERAL PRACTlcE I E.01[1], at E-5 (2d ed. 1978)
[hereinafter cited as 7A MOORE & PELAz].
Supplemental Rule E(7) applies only when the original action is in rem and the subject
res has been actually seized, or is quasi in remand goods, chattels, credits or effects of the
named defendant have been appropriated. It has been held that a counterclaim asserted to
an action that, while originally in rem, has been converted into an in personam action by
dismissal of the in rem count and release of the res is also outside the scope of the maritime
security provision. See Interstate Lighterage & Transportation Co. v. Newton Creek Towing
Co., 259 F, 318 (E.D.N.Y. 1919). It is arguable, however, that a plaintiff commencing an
action by attachment or arrest and against whom a counterclaim is asserted should not have
the option of converting the action to one solely in personam simply to avoid the cost of
posting a Rule E(7) bond since, by then, the damage done to the original defendant could be
considerable and permitting both parties to proceed in personam would not necessarily equalize the impact caused by the original arrest.
2. 7A MOORE & PELA z,
E.01[2), at E-8. For the text of the now superseded Admiralty
Rule 50, see id. .30, at 291. Admiralty Rule 50 was derived from Rule 53 of the Admiralty
Rules of 1844. The text of the latter Rule is also reproduced in id. .30, at p. 298.
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was true of its now superseded predecessor - leaves unanswered a
host of questions. It is the purpose of this article to ferret out some
of the problems created by this unique aspect of admiralty practice
and to suggest solutions.
THE SCOPE OF A RULE

E(7)

COUNTERCLAIM

The initial question to be determined is whether a Rule E(7)
counterclaim has a broader scope than a former Rule 50 cross-libel.
The now superseded Admiralty Rule provided for security on crosslibels "upon any counterclaim arising out of the same contract or
cause of action for which the original libel suit was filed. . . .3
While some courts narrowly interpreted that phrase, ' the better
reasoned Rule 50 cases permitted cross-libels for causes of action
arising out of the same transaction or occurrence giving rise to the
original suit. 5 There was an inherent limitation to all such actions,

however, in that the cross-libel was itself required to be of a maritime nature.' And, even a counterclaim arising out of the same
3. Id. .30, at p. 291. A cross-libel was not technically the same as a counterclaim, the
latter not being a part of the pre-1966 admiralty practice. See Cioffi v. New Zealand Shipping
Co., 73 F. Supp. 1015, 1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1947):
The practice in the admiralty, . . . is fairly well established. Where a party proceeded against in admiralty seeks to obtain affirmative relief against the one who
asserts a claim, it may proceed by way of cross-libel. In order to do so, it must initiate
the proceedings by process. Admiralty does not know of a counterclaim as that term
is known under the civil rules. Only if it is desired to set up matter in extinguishment
or reduction of the original demand is it permissible to allege such facts in the answer.
See also Ward v. Chamberlain, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 211 (1859); Mayer & Lage, Inc. v. Prince
Line, 264 F. 854, 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1920); and Hawgood & Avery Transit Co. v. Dingman, 94 F.
1011, 1015 (8th Cir. 1899).
4. For illustrations of cases narrowly interpreting superseded Admiralty Rule 50 and the
1844 Admiralty Rule it in turn superseded, see The Jane Palmer, 275 F. 719, 720 (S.D.N.Y.
1921); Southwestern Transp. Co. v. Pittsburg Coal Co., 42 F. 920, 921 (E.D. La. 1890); and
Crowell v. The Schooner Theresa Wolf, 4 F. 152, 153 (E.D. Pa. 1880).
5. See, for purposes of illustration, United Transportation & Lighterage Co. v. New York
& Baltimore Transp. Line, 185 F. 386 (2d Cir. 1911); The Highland Light, 88 F. 296 (N.D.
Wash. 1898); Vianello v. The Credit Lyonnais, 15 F. 637, 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1883); and Cudworth
v. The St. Cuthbert, 146 F. Supp. 857, 859 (E.D. Va. 1957) ("The trend appears to place a
broad interpretation upon the words 'same cause of action.'. . .The words are used in a more
general sense, meaning the same transaction, dispute or subject matter").
6. See The Kearney, 14 F.2d 949, 951 (3d Cir. 1926) ("The scope of admiralty rule No. 50
is confined to maritime subjects. Its evident purpose was to expedite by a single suit the
disposition of all maritime claims arising out of the same contract or cause of action."); and
United Transportation & Lighterage Co. v. New York & Baltimore Transportation Line, 180
F. 902 (S.D.N.Y. 1910). For contrary authority that does not seem to be supported by the
single precedent it cites, see 2 BENEZIc'r, THE LAw oF AMERICAN ADMIRALTY (6th ed. Knauth)
§ 329, at p. 454.
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contract, transaction or occurrence giving rise to the original maritime suit could, in many instances, be outside the jurisdiction of the
admiralty and thus beyond the scope of a Rule 50 cross-libel.
Supplemental Rule E(7) applies to counterclaims "arising out of
the same transaction or occurrence with respect to which the action
was originally filed.'" That language seems clearly to track the compulsory counterclaim language of Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a). It is evident
that Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a) has at least some applicability to maritime causes as a result of the 1966 merger of admiralty and civil
procedure.' And, Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a) counterclaims encompass, at
the very least, as broad an area as the most liberal Rule 50 decisions.
Moreover, neither the language of Fed. R. Civ. P. 13 nor the Advisory Committee's Note indicates that a non-maritime counterclaim
cannot be asserted in a maritime cause of action, and at least one
court has assumed that to be appropriate.? Thus, even if the Rule
7. 7A MOORE & PELAEZ E.01[11, at E-5.
8. See id. at .51[3], p. 379. Prior to unification there were no compulsory counterclaims
in the admiralty. See United States v. Fall River Navigation Co., 285 F. Supp. 354, 357
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); and Zim Israel Navigation Co. v. T. Chatani & Co., 249 F. Supp. 535
(S.D.N.Y. 1966). Thus, it was left to the defendant's discretion whether a maritime claim
arising out of the same transaction or occurrence as the original suit would be asserted in the
pending action. It is most probable that unification of maritime and civil procedures has
altered that situation. See The S.S. Hai Chang, 259 F. Supp. 75, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1966):
"Clearly, the clause in Rule 1, subjecting admiralty proceedings to the Federal Rules, must
mean that all admiralty proceedings are bound by all the Rules and not just the amended
ones."; Upper Lakes Shipping, Ltd. v. International Longshoremen's Association, 293 F.
Supp. 207, 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1968): "With the merger of the Civil and Admiralty Rules... Rule
13, F.R. Civ. P., governing counterclaims became applicable to admiralty proceedings ..
";
and Nyon Technical Commercial, Inc. v. Equitable Equipment Co., 341 F. Supp. 777, 781
(E.D. La. 1972): "One of the purposes of the merger was to allow admiralty the same liberal
practice of counterclaims as enjoyed by the civil practice." See also Judge Friendly's statement in Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800, 810 (2d Cir. 1971) in the text
accompanying note 12 infra.
It should be noted, however, that complete application of FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a) to causes
of action commenced within the federal courts' admiralty jurisdiction creates severe problems
that have not yet been fully determined by the courts. Thus, it can not be stated with absolute
certainty, by way of illustration, that a defendant possessing a non-maritime claim arising
out of the same transaction or occurrence giving rise to the maritime cause of action asserted
against him must raise that claim in his responsive pleading or be deemed to have waived
the claim.
9. See Industrial Equipment and Marine Services, Inc. v. M/V Mr. Gus, 333 F. Supp. 578,
580 (S.D. Tex. 1971), where the court, without discussion, assumes there can be a nonmaritime compulsory counterclaim to a maritime cause of action. That assumption, however,
raises difficult problems the court did not consider. See note 14 infra.
For contrary analogous authority, see McCann v. Falgout Boat Co., 44 F.R.D. 34 (S.D. Tex.
1968), where the court concluded that a defendant in a maritime case could not join as an
additional defendant a third-party whose alleged obligation was non-maritime in character.
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E(7) "same transaction or occurrence" language is deemed no
broader than the Rule 50 "same contract or cause of action" language, its scope insofar as maritime causes of action are concerned
is most probably far greater.' 0 And, the broader the scope of the
maritime counterclaim practice, the broader the potential reach of
Supplemental Rule E(7).
Generally, a compulsory counterclaim can-indeed, often
must-be asserted even though there is no independent jurisdictional basis which would have enabled that claim to be asserted in
a federal court. Such a counterclaim would be within the federal
The court was greatly swayed by the fact that impleader of a non-maritime third party
defendant was not permitted under the former Admiralty Rules and that the Advisory Committee effecting the 1966 unification of admiralty and civil procedures, had it desired to
change that facet of the former Admiralty Practice, could easily have indicated an intention
to do so. However, the Advisory Committee may have felt it so clear that coalesence broadened the admiralty's pendent and ancillary jurisdiction that further statements to that effect
were deemed unnecessary. That, apparently, was the basis of the American Law Institute's
failure to recommend that such jurisdiction be expanded in its Study of the Division of
Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts (1969). There, the ALI recommended no
jurisdictional changes in those areas, optimistically reasoning that: "[s]ince the unification
of admiralty and civil procedure, the doctrines of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction will
permit joinder or impleader in any case in which the transaction or occurrence involved gives
rise to both maritime and non-maritime claims." ALl Study at 228.
While it can be said that FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a) now makes it too clear for argument that
any cause of action arising out of the same transaction or occurrence as an original maritime
action must be asserted as a counterclaim, regardless of whether the counterclaim is itself of
a maritime nature, such a conclusion does radically differ from the former Admiralty Practice
and there is no indication that this change was specifically considered and consciously
adopted. Notwithstanding the lack of such specific comment, however, it is believed that the
far better view is to make FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a) fully applicable to maritime causes so that it
will not be necessary to have two lawsuits where one will suffice and so that such litigation
will not be encumbered by difficult questions of collateral estoppel bound to arise when such
matters are separately litigated.
10. This would necessarily follow in that a defendant with a maritime cause of action
arising out of the same transaction or occurrence as the original maritime suit is today most
probably compelled to assert that claim, whereas under superseded Admiralty Rule 50 assertion of such a counterclaim, while permissible, was not mandatory; and because it may well
be that now even non-maritime counterclaims must be asserted in maritime actions if they
arise out of the same transaction or occurrence giving rise to the original suit. The latter
counterclaims could not be asserted under superseded Admiralty Rule 50. Thus, the scope of
the current counterclaim practice in maritime actions is clearly broader than it previously
was, even if the same transaction or occurrence language of FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a) is deemed
no broader than the "same contract or cause of action" language of the superseded Admiralty
Rule. Moreover, it is not entirely inconceivable that the courts will conclude that the range
of counterclaims within the scope of FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a) is broader than the range of
counterclaims permitted by even the more liberal Rule 50 decisions, thereby further broadening the ambit of compulsory maritime counterclaims.
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court's ancillary jurisdiction." Before unification the doctrine of
ancillary jurisdiction was virtually, if not actually, unknown to the
admiralty. As stated by Judge Friendly:
Prior to the 1966 merger, there was no rule of compulsory
counterclaim, much less a doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction, in
the maritime jurisdiction, and permissive cross-libels were limited to claims in admiralty arising out of the same contract or
cause of action as the original claim. 2
Judge Friendly went on to note that, as a result of unification, he
could perceive of no barrier to a federal court exercising its power
of ancillary jurisdiction over a compulsory counterclaim to a maritime cause of action. He said:
With merger . . .Rule 13 became applicable to proceedings
brought in the admiralty jurisdiction . . .There is no evident
reason why the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction should not now
be applicable as well to compulsory counterclaims which arise
in the context of suits in admiralty. 3
What meager authority there is supports the conclusion of Judge
Friendly." To the extent unification has incorporated the doctrine
11. See 3 J. MooinE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 13.1511.
12. Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800, 810 n.11 (2d Cir. 1971).
13. Id. See also 3 J. MOoRE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE, 13.1511], expressing approval of Judge
Friendly's dictum.
14. However, a full and complete extension of FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a) tocauses within the
district courts' admiralty jurisdiction raises problems the courts have not yet fully considered
and which are incapable of easy resolution. For example, if the claim arising out of the same
transaction or occurrence is maritime in nature, it will be incumbent on the defendant to
assert that claim in the original non-jury maritime proceeding, therefore losing the right to
proceed with that claim in a state court where he could have had that claim determined by
a jury. Thus, at least in the absence of an independent basis of federal jurisdiction enabling
the original defendant to label his counterclaim as being civil in nature, FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a)
works to subvert the Saving to Suitors clause contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1333, which would
have enabled the original defendant to assert his claim as an action at law wherein he could
have obtained a jury trial. If the defendant's cause of action arising out of the same transaction or occurrence as the original suit is not maritime, requiring him to assert it in the original
suit would result either in permitting the original plaintiff's election to proceed within the
admiralty jurisdiction to subvert the defendant's constitutional right to a jury trial; in the
bifurcation of the cause, having the original cause heard by the court and the counterclaim
determined by the jury; or in compelling the entire case to be determined by the jury by an
extension of the rationale of Fitzgerald v. United States Line, 374 U.S. 16 (1963). There are
obvious problems with each alternative, especially when the original suit is in rem or quasi
in rem, since such matters have always been deemed within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
admiralty and decisions permitting trial of such causes by a jury are rare. See generally
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of ancillary jurisdiction into the admiralty practice it further broadens the scope of those compulsory counterclaims that may now be
asserted, and in so doing, potentially enlarges the impact of the
admiralty rule providing for the posting of security to answer
Robertson, Admiralty ProcedureAnd JurisdictionAfter The 1966 Unification; 74 MIH. L.
REv. 1627, 1648-52 (1976).
Thus, while it seems sensible to conclude that merger did away with the need to have two
lawsuits involving the same issues, it is evident that it has created new problems which are
incapable of easy resolution.
While it appears somewhat necessarily to follow that the incorporation of the civil rules
into maritime causes includes FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a), it is disturbing that the Advisory Committee did not more fully indicate the extent to which the 1966 unification affected counterclaim practice and provide a guideline for resolving the difficult problems that a complete
application of those Rules raises. In United States v. Isthmian Steamship Co., 359 U.S. 314
(1959), the Court alluded to the traditional justifications given for narrowly restricting the
scope of cross-libels that could be filed in a maritime cause. It there said:
Traditionally, admiralty has narrowly circumscribed the filing of unrelated crosslibels and defenses. . . . [Viarious reasons have been offered for refusal to entertain
unrelated defenses: protection of the seaman's wage claims; preservation of relatively
simple proceedings not affecting third-party rights; and the recognition that allowing
cross-libels might deprive litigants of jury trials to which they would otherwise be
entitled if the cross-libel were pressed in an independent proceeding.
Id. at 320. In that case, the Supreme Court made clear that any change in the prevailing
admiralty practice should be effectuated by rulemaking or by legislation, and not by decision.
Id. at 323. Moreover, the Court thought that so radical a departure from prior admiralty
practice should not be accomplished without the hearings that normally accompany intelligent rulemaking, and it specifically alluded to the responsibilities of the Judicial Conference
of the United States in the rule-making process. Id. There is no indication that, in effectuating unification, any specific consideration was given to the complex problems surrounding
extension of FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a) to facets of the admiralty practice formerly unaffected by
the traditional compulsory counterclaim practice. Moreover, FED. R. CIv. P. 38(a) makes it
abundantly clear that the Rules are not intended to affect a litigant's right to a jury trial;
and FED. R. Civ. P. 38(e) makes it clear that the Rules cannot create the right to a jury trial
by maritime litigants who, before unification, were not possessed of such a right.
Thus, while this author is of a different opinion, it most certainly can yet be cogently argued
that unification of the civil and admiralty procedures did not work a complete incorporation
of FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a) into admiralty causes and should be construed only as carrying
forward the prior admiralty practice, and that a complete unification should not be deemed
to have occurred until further and more specific attention to the problems raised in this note
are given by either the legislature or the appropriate rulemaking bodies. See the discussion
of McCann v. Falgout Boat Co. in note 9 supra. Adherence to this interpretation of the Rules
would, as before, occasionally result in the need to have two lawsuits where in an ordinary
nonmaritime civil action one would suffice. However, that is precisely what was deemed
necessary in United States v. Isthmian Steamship Co., and the Court thought that route
preferable to judicially short-circuiting the more ponderous traditional rule making procedures. It is not totally inconceivable that shortcuts by the appropriate rule making bodies
should be no more capable of achieving an end to the prior settled admiralty practice than
judicial shortcuts. While it is believed the McCann approach is not completely persuasive,
the arguments that case makes do raise serious doubts and deal with legitimate concerns.
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charges asserted by way of counterclaim. 5
Unification of maritime and civil procedure may also broaden the
scope of permissive counterclaims that can be asserted in a mari15. When the original maritime action is solely in rem the plaintiff obtains no in personam
jurisdiction over the owner or claimant of the arrested res. Thus, it seems reasonably clear
that the owner or claimant defending the claim need not assert any counterclaims he may
have against the plaintiff, even though such claims may arise out of the same transaction or
occurrence giving rise to the original suit. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a) which provides that the
defendant need not assert counterclaims arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is
the subject matter of the original suit if" ... (2) the opposing party brought suit upon his
claim by attachment or other process by which the court did not acquire jurisdiction to render
a personal judgment on that claim, and the pleader is not stating any counterclaim under
this Rule 13." But see the discussion in 7A MOORE & PELAEZ E.16.
If the original action was in personam but jurisdiction over the defendant was obtained by
the attachment of his goods, chattels, credits or effects within the district, personal jurisdiction over that defendant is indeed obtained, but in the absence of a general appearance a
judgment in excess of the value of the attached property cannot usually be rendered. It is
not altogether clear whether a defendant over whom this limited type of "in personam jurisdiction" is obtained is similarly excused from the need to assert counterclaims arising out of
the same transaction or occurrence upon which the original suit is based. It is believed that
the better view, and one more consistent with Supplemental Rule E(8) permitting one whose
property has been attached to enter a restricted appearance, would be to excuse such a
defendant from the need to file compulsory counterclaims. It would, indeed, be somewhat
anomalous to conclude that one whose property has been attached must choose between
asserting or forever losing a counterclaim and opening up the floodgates of a verdict much
larger than the value of his property that has been attached. A more sensible conclusion is
that the jurisdiction over the defendant that is sufficient to trigger application of FED.R. Cirv.
P. 13(a) must be an unlimited personal jurisdiction as opposed to the very limited type of
personal jurisdiction obtained by a maritime attachment.
Thus, while the extension of FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a) to the maritime practice has undoubtedly
broadened the scope of counterclaims that may be asserted - and, indeed, that must be
asserted if the maritime action is commenced by personal service of process and not by way
of in rem arrest or, possibly, by quasi in rem attachment - it most likely gives to the in rem
defendant an option as to whether he wants to assert his counterclaim in the action commenced by the plaintiff or desires instead to assert his claim arising out of the same transaction
or occurrence in a wholly separate and distinct legal proceeding. However, if a defendant or
claimant asserts any counterclaim arising out of the same transaction or occurrence, he most
likely will have to assert all such counterclaims he may have and will not be able to pick and
choose among them. See 3 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 13.14[4].
The significance of this is that a claimant whose property has been arrested and, most
likely, a defendant whose property has been subjected to a maritime attachment, may at his
election make use of the counterclaim mechanisms - including the doctrine of ancillary
jurisdiction - and, in so doing, possibly subject the original plaintiff to being forced to
comply with the provisions of Supplemental Rule E(7), requiring the posting of security to
answer counterclaims asserted by one whose property has been arrested or attached. Thus,
the full extent of Supplemental Rule E(7) can be ascertained only by first determining the
extent to which the compulsory counterclaims embraced within its scope are in fact compulsory in maritime attachment and arrest cases and the extent to which the original defendants
to such actions may elect to proceed in a manner that takes their claims arising out of the
same transaction or occurrence of the original suit beyond the scope of the exclusionary
provisions of FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a)(2).
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time action,"8 and there is room to argue that the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction should be similarly expanded to embrace at least
some permissive counterclaims asserted in a maritime case."7 It is
not likely, however, that judicial development in this area will have
an expansive effect on Supplemental Rule E(7) since that rule most
likely will continue to be construed as being applicable only to compulsory counterclaims."
In determining what types of counterclaims are compulsory for
Rule E(7) purposes reference should not be limited solely to maritime precedents under the superseded Admiralty Rules. Language
in non-maritime civil cases should also be examined, since those
precedents are now most probably relevant in determining this procedural issue. Since the non-maritime precedents approach the
problem unencumbered by the former admiralty cautions borne of
the restrictive nature of pre-unification counterclaims permissible
in the admiralty, they are likely to prove more expansive. Thus,
while it is clear that Rule E(7) applies to all matters formerly
deemed the proper subject of a cross-libel, and very likely to matters
that would have been within the scope of former Admiralty Rule 50
had there been a maritime jurisdictional basis for the claim, it is
conceivable that its scope has been even further enlarged as a result
of the incorporation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a) into admiralty practice. 9
16. See Industrial Equipment and Marine Services, Inc. v. MN Mr. Gus, 333 F. Supp.
578 (S.D. Tex. 1971), permitting a permissive non-maritime counterclaim to be asserted in a
maritime case. There was, however, an independent basis of federal jurisdiction that would
have supported the counterclaim.
17. See Robertson, note 14 supra.
18. Supplemental Rule E(7) is applicable only to counterclaims "arising out of the same
transaction or occurrence with respect to which the action was originally filed." 7A MOORE &
PELAEZ
E.01[1], at E-5. It is not likely that any counterclaims satisfying that requirement
will be deemed permissive in nature.
19. The conclusion that the incorporation of FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a) into the admiralty
practice has enlarged the scope of Supplemental Rule E(7) counterclaims is premised on the
assumption that security to answer the counterclaim can be demanded even where the counterclaim is in personam and not in rem or quasi in rem. Obviously, a maritime quasi in rem
counterclaim could never occur because in all instances the original plaintiff, by his act of
commencing the original action, can be "found within the district" so as to destroy the
availability of maritime quasi in rem jurisdiction. See 7A MOORE & PELAEZ B.06 at B-251.
While there might be some few state attachment remedies within the ambit of compulsory
counterclaims to a maritime cause of action, their number and significance would be of so
limited a nature as to be comparatively unimportant. Similarly, there would be difficulties
with limiting the scope of Supplemental Rule E(7) counterclaims to those which are'in rem
since ordinarily the plaintiff in a maritime proceeding - even if in rem - is an individual,
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THE POSTING OF SECURITY

A major consequence of Supplemental Rule E(7) is that it can
significantly raise the cost of bringing a maritime suit in rem or
quasi in rem. A plaintiff bringing such an action who is potentially
subject to a counterclaim arising out of the same transaction or
occurrence upon which his suit is based may find that, in order to
prevent a stay or dismissal of his action 20 he will be required to post
and any maritime lien that the original defendant might possess would be against maritime
property of that plaintiff, and such property is not a party to the original action. Thus, by
necessity, most counterclaims under Rule E(7), as was true of most cross-libels under former
Admiralty Rule 50, would be asserted against the plaintiff-owner of the property in which
the lien exists and therefore would be technically in personam even if premised on a claim
that also gives rise to a maritime lien. But see Partenreederei Wallschiff v. The Pioneer, 120
F. Supp. 525, 528 (E.D. Mich. 1954), indicating that cross-libels in rem are permissible. See
also the discussion in the text accompanying note 104 infra. It seems evident, however, that
such "counterclaims" would have to be executed in the same manner as original in rem
process so that the court would obtain in rem jurisdiction over the res owned by the original
plaintiff. See Frontier Acceptance Corp. v. United Freight Forwarding Co., 286 F. Supp. 367
(D.N.J. 1968), and. the cases cited in note 3 supra. However, even if the owner's vessel can
be proceeded against by counterclaim in an action brought by the owner, it would be necessary for that vessel to be within the district at or shortly after the time the counterclaim is
filed for jurisdiction to attach. See The Bristol, Fed. Cas. No. 1,889 (S.D.N.Y. 1870). That
being the case, it is difficult to understand the statement, unsupported by any citations, in
Spriggs v. Hoffstot, 240 F. 2d 76, 78 (4th Cir. 1957), that: "While there is some division among
the authorities as to whether or not it is permissible in any event to invoke the rule [former
Admiralty Rule 50] where the original libel is in rem and the cross-libel is in personam, the
Court accepted the view that the rule may apply to such a situation." This statement has
prompted one commentator to caution that "Because of the statement in Spriggs v. Hoffstat
• . . the counterclaim should, whenever possible, be lodged in rem." McCreary, Going for the
Juglar Vein: Arrests and Attachments in Admiralty, 28 OHIO ST. L.J. 19, 40 (1967). Aside
from the practical problems of following that advice, and the real party in interest and
jurisdictional problems that such an approach would spawn, the statement in Spriggs v.
Hoffstot simply does not square with the case authority under the superseded Admiralty
Rule. Undoubtedly moved by the practical problems of limiting the scope of Rule 50 to in
rem counterclaims, virtually all decisions permitted the Rule to apply where the securityposting cross-libellant's counterclaim was in personam. See Morse Ironworks & Dry Dock
Co. v. Luckenbach, 123 F. 332, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1903): "In The Electron, a libel in rem had
been filed against the vessel and the claimant had given security. He then filed a cross-libel
in personam and the first action was stayed until it [security for the cross-claim[ was given.
It was an ordinary case of the applicationof the rule." (emphasis added).

Thus, it seems clear - both from the unequivocal language of Supplemental Rule E(7) and
by the fact it was derived from former Admiralty Rule 50 - that the counterclaims within
its scope for which security can be demanded may be in personam and need not be in rem or
quasi in rem.
However, compelling the posting of security by a party who is asserting an in personam
claim and who is not attaching any property belonging to the party against whom the claim
is directed, is in and of itself highly unusual and raises a problem which may be of constitutional dimensions.
20. See text accompanying note 95 infra.
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security sufficient to compensate the defendant-counterclaimant for
the damages the latter alleges. As a result, the already burdensome
costs of commencing an in rem or quasi in rem proceeding may be
escalated beyond the reach of some plaintiffs.' Moreover, it is at
least conceivable that the original plaintiff may be compelled to
assume these costs even though the claim against him is one that,
but for the fact it is being asserted by way of counterclaim to a
maritime arrest or attachment proceeding, could not properly have
been asserted in rem or quasi in rem. Thus, but for the fact the
claim is being asserted as a counterclaim to an in rem or quasi in
rem proceeding, the original plaintiff could not have been compelled
to post security of any kind. In this regard Supplemental Rule E(7)
has a decidedly deterrent effect on the use of maritime arrest and
attachment procedures. A plaintiff who fears such reprisals may, of
course, elect to proceed in personam. However, the transient nature
of the maritime industry often makes proceeding in rem or quasi in
rem the only viable alternative to litigating a claim in a distant, and
thus inconvenient and expensive, forum. If the globe-shrinking policies behind the maritime procedures in rem and quasi in rem are to
be realized, a considerable amount of judicial discretion should be
2
exercised in applying Supplemental Rule E(7).
Initially, it seems reasonably clear that a plaintiff against whom
a counterclaim is asserted can only be compelled to post security
when the original defendant has himself been compelled to post
security to respond in damages. While the language of Rule E(7)
seems broad enough to embrace situations in which the security is
voluntarily given, there is no indication that it is intended to alter
the prior practice established in Washington-Southern Navigation
21. See 7A MOORE & PELAEZ
E.04, at E-151; and E.12, at E-551, dealing with the
plaintiff's obligation to post security for costs and to make advance payment of the marshal's
expenses in keeping arrested and attached property.
22. A fundamental basis for the continued existence of separate maritime procedures has
been the desire to enhance maritime commerce by accommodating the often competing
interests of all whose efforts are required to successfully move the world's goods in ships. It
is apparent that persons are more readily encouraged to undertake the hazards of a seaman's
life; to provide services and supplies to transient vessels; and to risk significant sums of money
in vessels and shipment of cargo if wrongs can be remedied without chasing a defendant
around the globe in an attempt to obtain in personam jurisdiction over him. Thus, use of the
maritime procedures in rem and quasi in rem serves to encourage seamen, ship suppliers and
repairers, and those with venture capital to participate in marine enterprises which otherwise
might be unattractive. To a limited extent, Supplemental Rule E(7) works counter to the
goals prompting the maritime in rem and quasi in rem procedures.
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Co. v. Baltimore & PhiladelphiaSteamboat Co.": There, the plaintiff commenced an in personam action against the owner of a vessel
to recover damages for breach of a charter party. The owner's vessel
was not arrested or attached. The owner then filed a cross-libel
against the charterer and demanded that the latter be compelled to
give security to respond in damages to the counterclaim. The trial
court ordered the charterer to give such security provided the owner
first gave security to cover the charterer's claim, which the owner
did. The trial court then entered a decree staying all proceedings
until security on the counterclaim was posted. The question of
whether the order compelling security on the counterclaim was appropriate was certified to the Supreme Court. That Court concluded
the order was inappropriate, stating: "[S]ecurity to satisfy the
counterclaim could not be exacted by means of a stay, unless the
original libelant had compelled the giving of such security to satisfy
his own claim." 4 There is no indication that the current rule is
intended to alter this facet of the former admiralty practice and,
consequently, the voluntary posting of security by a defendant
whose property is neither arrested or attached is not likely to trigger
application of Rule E(7).
Adherence to the rule of Washington-Southern Navigation Co.
does not answer all questions as to when the security will be deemed
compulsory rather than voluntary. It is entirely conceivable, for
instance, that the parties may agree even before seizure that a bond
of a certain amount will be posted and, as a result of such agreement, actual seizure does not occur. 25 Will one posting such a bond
be deemed to have voluntarily provided it and thus be unentitled
to the benefits of Supplemental Rule E(7)? While there are no
American cases deciding the issue, 2 it is believed that an owner or
defendant so acting in an attempt to prevent the disruption of his
maritime activities is clearly distinguishable from the defendant
who voluntarily posted security in Washington-Southern Navigation Co., and should not be deemed to have lost any benefits pro23. 263 U.S. 629 (1924).
24. Id. at 639.
25. It has been held that this will be sufficient to confer in rem jurisdiction in the district
in which the suit was commenced. See In re Atlantic Gulf & West Indies S.S. Lines, 20 F.2d
975 (S.D.N.Y. 1927) and the discussion in 7A MOORE & PELAEZ I E.13[41.
26. For an indication that the British Admiralty law does not compel security on the
counterclaim where the vessel is released on stipulation before its arrest, see WashingtonSouthern Navigation, 263 U.S. at 638.
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vided by Rule E(7). Similarly, rather than posting a bond, owners
of vessels subject to arrest or attachment frequently provide the
plaintiff with an acceptable letter of undertaking or equivalent assurance to respond for any damages that may be awarded against
them. 27 There is no logical reason why such assurances should not
be deemed the equivalent of Rule E(7) security compelling at least
a similar assurance from the plaintiff to answer the defendant's
counterclaim. It is hoped, however, that prudent counsel would
cover this contingency in the initial agreement whenever a counterclaim arising out of the same transaction or occurrence is even a
remote possibility. In the absence of evidence of fraud, coercion, or
mutual and non-negligent mistake, such an agreement should be
binding upon the parties.
A more difficult problem arises when the original defendant or the
owner of a vessel seized in rem does not post security to obtain the
release of his vessel, letting it remain in the marshal's custody. If
the defendant or owner then files a counterclaim arising out of the
same transaction or occurrence giving rise to the original suit, can
he demand that the original plaintiff file Rule E(7) security? The
Rule provides that security on a counterclaim is appropriate whenever "the defendant or claimant in the original action has given
security to respond in damages. 218 It is, in that regard, virtually
identical to the language contained in superseded Admiralty Rule
50 .2 And, under the former Rule this issue was never clearly resolved.
In the usual case the owner or defendant has posted security to
obtain the release of his property before filing a counterclaim. It is
clear that one proceeding in that manner is within the scope of Rule
E(7) and is entitled to request that the original plaintiff be compelled to post security to answer a counterclaim arising out of the
same transaction or occurrence giving rise to the original suit. It has
been contended, moreover, that seizure of the vessel is tantamount
to the giving of security, regardless of whether the vessel is subsequently released on bond or stipulation. There is considerable merit
to this contention since whether the arrested or attached property
is released on bond or remains in the custody of the court, it serves
to provide the original plaintiff with a fund from which any judg27.
28.
29.

See 7A MOORE & PELAEZ
Id. E.01[1]., at E-5.
See id. .30, at p. 291.

E.13[41, at E-637.
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ment he ultimately receives can be satisfied. Moreover, retention of
the property by the court is surely as burdensome to the original
defendant or owner as the posting of a bond or other security,31 and
it is patently clear that the security the arrested or attached property provides is not voluntarily submitted. Yet, it can also be argued
that the Rule requirement that the owner or claimant "give" security is not fulfilled where the security is provided without the latter's
efforts and results solely from the arrest or seizure of his property
rather than from a transfer made by him. In such a case the security
is not "given" by him so much as it is "taken from" him. The
decisions of the lower courts - all interpreting the now superseded
Supreme Court Admiralty Rules - are in conflict.3 1 The Supreme
Court has not spoken on the matter, but it has made clear that the
purpose of the Rule is to place the parties on an equal basis insofar
as security is concerned.3 2 Even where the vessel is not released on
bond; it does provide the original plaintiff with security. Moreover,
the loss of the vessel is detrimental to the owner and, unless the
plaintiff too has to post security, there is an apparent inequality.
Thus, it is believed that the policy behind the Rule can best be
fulfilled by requiring security on the counterclaim even though the
arrested or attached res remains in custody, at least where the original defendant or claimant has failed to obtain the res' release because of his financial insecurity.3 This was the apparent approach
30. Indeed, the loss of use of the res can be far more costly than the cost of a bond.
31. For authority that the original plaintiff can be compelled to post security to answer
the defendant's or claimant's counterclaim even though the res has not been released, see
Empresa Maritima a Vapor v. North & South American Steam Navigation Co., 16 F. 502,
504 (S.D.N.Y. 1883) ("The fact that the vessel is in custody and has not been bonded
certainly does not make it unjust for the respondents to file security, according to the rule.
The vessel while under arrest is itself security in the suit in rem."); The Evangeline, 36 F.2d
426 (S.D.N.Y. 1929), reaching the same conclusion under superseded Admiralty Rule 50
where the original defendant was financially unable to procure the release of its arrested
vessel; and Flota Maritima Browning De Cuba, Sociedad Anonima v. Motor Vessel Ciudad
De La Habana, 245 F. Supp. 205 (D. Md. 1965), aff'd, 363 F.2d 733 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 837 (1966).
For contrary authority, see Pan American Shipping Corp. v. Maritima Columbiana Limitada, 193 F.2d 845, 847 (5th Cir. 1952) ("The rule in its present form has no application unless
the respondent or claimant in the original suit, i.e., the cross-libellant, has given security to
respond in damages and has given it under compulsion to obtain the release of a vessel.");
The Owego, 289 F. 263 (W.D. Wash. 1923); and Mianos Yacht Yard Corp. v. The Blue Cloud,
114 F. Supp. 930 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
32. See Washington-Southern Navigation, 263 U.S. at 638-39; "Here, as in England, the
purpose of the provision was declared to be to place the parties on an equality as regards
security." See also Eastern Transp. Co. v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 36, 38 (E.D.N.Y. 1951).
33. Supplemental Rule E(7), as was true of its predecessors, specifically provides the court
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followed in Flota Maritime Browning De Cuba, Sociedad Anonima
3" where the court said:
v. Motor Vessel Ciudad De La Habana,
It is not necessary in this case to decide all of the questions
raised by Rule 50. It is sufficient to say that in this Court's
opinion the failure of a claimant to post security to release a
vessel which has been seized under a libel in rem does not per
se prevent such claimant, who is usually the respondent as
well, from obtaining cross-security under Rule 50 from a libelant against which it has filed a cross-libel in a cause of action
arising out of the same contract or cause of action. Whether
such security should be required, however, and the amount of
such security, if required, is always in the discretion of the
Court, "for cause shown." 3
This approach seems capable of satisfying the purpose of the Rule
while permitting the court to exercise the discretionary control that
has always been part and parcel of the procedure for requiring security on counterclaims.
If security to respond to the counterclaim is required, it is to be
"in the usual amount and form to respond in damages to the claims
set forth in such counterclaim. ' 3 That phrase, taken nearly intact
from the superseded Admiralty Rule, 3 is also unclear. Where the
with a degree of discretion in enforcing the security requirement. See the text of the Rule in
7A MOORE & PELAEZ E.01[11, at E-5, where the duty to provide security on a counterclaim
is qualified by the phrase ". . . unless the court, for cause shown, shall otherwise direct." It
is clear that the party seeking to avoid posting of security has the burden of showing the
requisite cause. See Empresa Maritima A Vapor v. North & South American Steam Navigation Co., 16 F. 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1883); The Transit, 210 F. 575 (E.D. Pa. 1914); and WashingtonSouthern Navigation, 263 U.S. at 632 n.1, where in a footnote the Court said, "It has been
said that the burden is upon the original libellant to show why he should be relieved from
giving the security." Those decisions also indicate that the financial inability of the original
plaintiff to provide security may be a sufficient cause to justify dispensing with the need for
security. It follows that an original defendant who lacks the financial ability to secure the
release of his vessel should not be placed in an even more precarious position because of his
insolvency. See Spriggs v. Hoffstot, 240 F.2d 76, 79 (4th Cir. 1957), "Even if a bond would
normally be demandable, it may . . . be excused if the Court finds it unreasonable to require
it, as when the requirement cannot be met because of the respondent's financial condition,
and insistence would result in an automatic stay, denying him a day in court on his claim.
The Court can then in its discretion 'otherwise direct.'
34. 245 F. Supp. 205 (D. Md. 1965), aff'd, 363 F.2d 733 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
837 (1966).
35. Id. at 209.
36. 7A MOORE & PELAEZ E.01[1], at E-5.
37. See superseded Admiralty Rule 50 at id. .30.
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original suit is in rem for $100,000 and the counterclaim by the
owner who filed a bond of that size to procure the release of his
vessel is for $50,000, it is usually simple enough to conclude that the
plaintiff must now himself post a bond sufficient to cover the counterclaim or suffer the Rule E(7) sanctions.3 It is not clear, however,
whether a counterclaimant seeking an amount greater than the
damages sought by the original plaintiff can compel the posting of
a bond sufficient to cover the damages he alleges.
In Spriggs v. Hoffstot, 39 The Valjean, owned by Spriggs, collided
with The Misty, owned by Hoffstot. The Misty sank, was salvaged
and had an after the occurrence value of $700. Hoffstot filed libels
in rem and in personam against The Valjean and its owner. The
vessel was seized and released on a bond that was subsequently
reduced to $25,000. Personal injury actions by third parties arising
out of the collision and amounting to some $300,000 were also filed
against The Valjean and its owner, Spriggs. Spriggs then filed a
cross-libel in the original suit seeking indemnity or contribution
should a verdict be recovered against him in the second suit. He
sought security on his counterclaim, and the trial judge left open the
question of whether Admiralty Rule 50 was applicable to the occurrence. The trial judge did., however, vacate the ex parte order staying
the original suit pending posting of security on the cross-libel and
it was the propriety of vacating that order that was appealed.
The Court of Appeals accurately zeroed in on the effect of Spriggs'
request. It said:
As we view appellant's case, it seems to come to this: had he
seized appellee's boat, The Misty, appellant could have required a bond in the amount of its value - not over $700 after
the collision; yet because The Misty was not seized or released,
appellant claims to be entitled to security for the full amount
of his claim - $150,000.40
The court, recognizing that the original purpose of permitting security on counterclaims was to "place the parties on an equality as
regards security", 4' thought literal application of Rule 50 inappropriate. Moreover, the court refused even to compel the original
38.
of his
39.
40.
41.

The result might, of course, be different if the original plaintiff can convince the court
insolvency.
240 F.2d 76 (4th Cir. 1957).
Id. at 79.

Id.
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plaintiff to post security in an amount equal to that provided by the
counterclaiming defendant. It said:
In the present instance, will equality be attained by requiring bond for the full claim of the cross-libellant? Or is it more
equitable and just to say to the cross-respondent, "Since you
demanded and received bond for $25,000, you will be required
to give the cross-libellant security in an equal amount"? The
latter would seem to us to be a nearer approximation of equality; but even bond in that amount may not in all circumstances
fairly be demanded. When the rule gives the cross-libellant a
right to "security in the usual amount," his bond need not
necessarily be in the exact amount of the original libellant's
bond; nor is it necessarily in the amount of the cross-claim,
because as in the original libellant's case . . . so in the crosslibellant's case the amount is subject to the exercise of the

judge's discretion .42
Thus, the court concluded that in exercising the discretion built into
the Rule the trial judge need not be governed by the amount of bond
given by the original defendant nor even by the size of the counterclaim, and is free to set the bond in an amount that is "just and
reasonable under all the circumstances." 3
Spriggs makes clear that the "just and reasonable" test can occasionally be fulfilled by dispensing with the Rule E(7) type security
altogether; and that normally it cannot justify imposition of a bond
larger than that posted by the counterclaiming original defendant."
While the flexible approach used by the Spriggs court is commendable, it is believed that it would be a perversion of its admonitions
against use of mechanical formulae to conclude that it absolutely
precludes imposition of a larger bond on the counterclaim than was
required of the original defendant. A holding of that nature would
serve only to encourage sham suits and races to the courthouse.
Suppose, by way of illustration, that two vessels collide and one
suffers only minor damage and the other sustains very severe damage. If the owner of the slightly damaged vessel commences an ac42. Id.
43. Id.at 80.
44. For a decision refusing to compel greater security on the counterclaim than was
required to secure the res' release, see Geotas Compania De Vapores S.A. v. S.S. Arie H.,
237 F. Supp. 908 (E.D. Pa. 1964). The court was careful not to posit its conclusion as a firm
rule, however, limiting its decision to the circumstances of the case before it.
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tion in rem against the severely damaged vessel, a relatively small
bond will be required by the owner of the severely damaged vessel.
If the owner of the latter vessel is compelled to assert his much
larger claim in the same action,45 it might be grossly unfair to limit
the security for his claim to the amount of the bond he had to
provide, since had he first commenced his action he could have
compelled the posting of a bond large enough to compensate for the
severe damages he alleges. In such a case, it might well be "just and
reasonable" and more in keeping with the purposes of the rule providing for security on counterclaims to require that the original
plaintiff post a larger bond to protect against the counterclaim than
the original defendant had to post to protect against the original
action."
Where the counterclaim is not one that could initially have been
commenced in rem or quasi in rem, however, there seems little
justification for ever requiring a larger bond on the counterclaim
than is required in the original action. Indeed, such a requirement
would rest on the most tenuous of legal footing.
Compelling the posting of any security by a party who has no
property whose release he is attempting to secure is contrary to our
judicial system. The problem is exacerbated when the claim for
which security is demanded does not rise to the stature of a maritime lien and is against a party who can clearly be found within the
district in which the suit is commenced, since actions of those types
could not initially have been commenced in rem or quasi in rem. To
require security under the rubric of "equality" in such instances
is to ignore the fact that "equality" is achieved by discriminating
against maritime lien claimants by imposing upon them a duty no
other defendant to a similar counterclaim could be compelled to
45. It is conceivable that a defendant possessing a counterclaim might be able to circumvent the effects of FED. R. Cv. P. 13(a) and Supplemental Rule E(7) by entering a special
appearance to the in rem action and commencing a wholly separate suit to recover the
damages he seeks. Thus, he would not have to worry that the bond on the original suit is less
than the amount he claims. The courts should not, however, encourage two law suits where
one would suffice, and should thus not hesitate to compel a larger bond on an E(7) counterclaim than was required to secure the release of the property arrested or attached in the
original suit.
46. If the courts are not alert to such facts, it might encourage the filing of sham suits by
parties who know they are potential targets for large in rem actions. Similarly, a flat rule
providing that security on counterclaims cannot exceed the amount of the original defendant's bond would encourage races to the courthouse by the least injured of parties sustaining
damages in a maritime occurrence.
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bear. It may well be reasonable to impose a duty to provide security
upon a maritime claimant who, even in the absence of the fortuitous
circumstance that he was the first to seek maritime relief, could
properly have been subjected to this burden. It is quite another
thing, however, to compel a plaintiff to post security for a claim
where imposition of such a duty could not have been required had
the claim been asserted in an original suit against him rather than
by way of counterclaim. At some point, the procedure rises very
nearly to the imposition of a penalty on a party for exercising the
right to proceed in rem or quasi in rem.
Where the election to proceed in rem or quasi in rem is purely for
the convenience of the original plaintiff or constitutes an attempt
by him to exert pressure on the defendant to settle a claim on a more
than reasonable basis to avoid disruption to a maritime enterprise
or the assumption of greatly increased costs, equalization of such a
burden is at least equitably justified. It must be remembered, however, that frequently the costly election to proceed in rem or quasi
in rem is mandated by the transient nature of vessels and their
crews and the logistical and practical problems often inherent in the
use of ordinary in personam remedies to effectuate satisfaction of
just claims in such instances. Where that is the basis for the original
action, compelling the posting of security to respond in damages for
counterclaims that could only have been brought in personam had
not the original action been in rem may be neither necessary nor
desirable, and comes close to unconscionably, if not actually unconstitutionally, interfering with the original plaintiff's right to use the
maritime procedures to effectuate the relief he seeks. This facet of
the counterclaim problem was unlikely to arise prior to the 1966
unification of admiralty and civil procedures since all counterclaims, in addition to arising out of the same transaction or occurrence, had to be of a maritime nature47 and were thus frequently,
if not usually, actions that could originally have been brought in
rem or quasi in rem.4" With unification, however, claims that could
47. See note 6 supra.
48. The great majority of causes of action within the admiralty jurisdiction arise out of
occurrences involving vessels and maritime cargo. In many of these instances, the injured
party has both a cause of action in personam against the owner of the vessel or cargo and,
additionally, a maritime lien that can be executed by the commencement of an action in rem
C.02-C.06. Thus, the
against the vessel or cargo. See generally 7A MOORE & PELAEZ
defendant asserting a counterclaim under the former admiralty practice usually was asserting
a claim - that had it been separately brought - could have been in rem or quasi in rem
and thus have compelled the posting of security to answer that claim.
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formerly have been brought only in separate non-maritime actions
-where posting of security could not be required-are at least
arguably within the scope of Supplemental Rule E(7).19 Whether
''equality" will require that one asserting such claims has the new
found right to demand security where none could formerly be required remains to be seen. It is hoped, however, that courts confronted with such cases will not automatically compel security to be
posted, but will attempt to evaluate each case on its own facts. It
has been held that the rule requiring the original plaintiff to post
security to respond to the counterclaim constitutes "an exception to
the general principle that no party in admiralty can be required as
a condition of bringing suit to give security to satisfy the claim of
another."0 It seems obvious that this exception is not, and should
not be, all embracing.
THE EXEMPTION

OF SEAMEN

The requirement that an in rem or quasi in rem plaintiff provide
security for counterclaims rising out of the same transaction or occurrence giving rise to the original suit raises difficult problems
when that plaintiff is a seaman or is financially unable to post
security. In either of those situations can the original action be
stayed until security is provided?
The maritime law has long been protective of its seamen wards,
and Congress has specifically excepted them from prepaying costs
in suits for wages, salvage or the enforcement of laws enacted for
their health and safety.5 ' It is permissible for the bulk of seamen
49. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that unification of the civil and admiralty
procedures causes serious problems in the area of compulsory counterclaims. Application of
FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a) to causes commenced within the admiralty jurisdiction of the district
courts impacts upon the rights those with maritime causes of action have to proceed outside
the admiralty pursuant to the Saving to Suitors clause; and, when extended to non-maritime
claims possessed by original defendants to maritime causes, raises even more severe questions
concerning the counter-claimant's right to a jury trial. See note 14 supra. To extend Supplemental Rule E(7) to such causes further muddies the problem. Thus, it is not inconceivable
that courts will refuse to give E(7) the full range its language suggests, and will restrict its
application to those counterclaims asserting claims that could properly give rise to maritime
liens. Such a construction would reduce the problems raised in this area by procedural
unification.
50. Solomon v. Bruchhausen, 305 F.2d 941, 944 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951

(1963).
51. See 28 U.S.C. § 1916 and the extended discussion in 7A MOORE & PELAEz
E-151.

E.04, at
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suits to be commenced in rem or by way of maritime attachment
and it often occurs that the owner or defendant will file claims
against the plaintiff-seaman arising out of the transaction or occurrence giving rise to the original suit. 5 There is no clear answer as to
whether the seaman can be compelled to post security to answer the
counterclaim or suffer a stay of his own suit. What judicial authority
that exists, coupled with maritime policy generally, indicates that
the better view is to excuse seamen from this burden.
In Cudworth v. The St. Cuthbert,53 the master and crew of a
vessel brought an action in rem against the defendant vessel to
recover salvage benefits. The owner of the salvaged vessel filed a
cross-libel in personam against the plaintiffs, alleging that they
negligently grounded the vessel. The claimant-owner, who had
posted a $15,000 bond to secure the release of The St. Cuthbert,
alleged damages in excess of $25,000 and demanded Rule 50 security. In refusing the request for security the court said:
It is difficult to conceive of many salvage claims not prosecuted by a seaman unless it involves the raising of a vessel.
Realizing as we must that seamen would be unable to post
security on any cross-libel filed, it is rather apparent that the
Supreme Court had this in mind when it inserted the exception
in Rule 50, "unless the court for cause shown, shall otherwise
direct." To hold otherwise, salvage claims instituted by seamen could be effectively foreclosed.5"
However, it is evident that a seaman's wage claim is just as unlikely
to be brought by anyone other than a seaman and, in such an instance, a susequent decision by a higher court said only that
"[wihether in a seaman's suit for wages its policy [the policy of
Admiralty Rule 50] in a proper case would override the seaman's
right of free access is a difficult question which we need not decide
here." 55 The statutes exempting seamen from a duty to prepay costs
Jones Act suits can only be brought in personam. See Plamals v. S.S. "Pinar Del Rio",
C.06, at 647. Most other
causes of action possessed by seamen can be commenced either in rem or, at the seaman's
election, in personam.
53. 146 F. Supp. 857 (E.D. Va. 1957).
54. Id. at 858. See also Zubrod v. Associated Metals & Minerals Trade Co., 243 F. Supp.
340, 341 (E.D. Pa. 1965): "[Ilt may well be that no security is required of a libellant on a
cross-libel against the libellant when the libellant is a seaman."
55. Solomon v. Bruchhausen, 305 F.2d 941, 944 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951
(1963).
52.

277 U.S. 151 (1928), and the discussion in 7A MOORE & PELAEZ
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do not address themselves to this precise issue. They are, however,
reflective of a protective policy toward seamen generally and are
premised on the assumption that a seaman is usually not in a position to assume the burden of advancing costs. Moreover, unlike the
statute absolving poor persons of that duty,5" the statutes applicable
to seamen apply to penurious and affluent alike and cannot be
obviated by a showing of actual ability to pay. These statutes represent a legislative policy that is an outgrowth of centuries of admiralty practice and should not be ignored in the absence of specific
language to the contrary. Supplemental Rule E(7), which is written
in general terms and does not allude to this specific policy, was not
likely intended to interfere with this centuries old policy.
Perhaps the most persuasive authority that seamen should be
exempt from the requirement to provide security for counterclaims
is found in Washington-Southern Navigation Co. v. Baltimore &
PhiladelphiaSteamboat Co.,57 where Justice Brandeis, speaking for
a unanimous Court said:
The construction given to Rule 50 by the District Court
would, by imposing an impossible or onerous condition, deprive
many litigants of the right to prosecute their claims in admiralty. Among others, it would, if applied, generally, deny this
right to seamen, upon whom, regardless of their means or nationality, Congress, shortly before the adoption of rule 50, had
conferred the right to prosecute their claims, in both trial and
appellate courts, without giving security even for costs. It
would likewise deny to poor citizens of the United States the
right to proceed in admiralty, which Congress had by successive acts sought to ensure. . . . Obviously, it was not the intention of this court in adopting the rule, to disregard the right of
seamen, of poor persons or of others to prosecute suits in admiralty."
The action sanctioned by the lower court in Washington-Southern
Navigation Co., and condemned by the Supreme Court, was the
voluntary posting of security by the counter-claiming defendant, a
procedure that could convert any in personam action into the equivalent of an action in rem and result in a stay pending posting of
56. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), discussed in 7A MOORE & PELAEZ
57.
58.

263 U.S. 629 (1924).
Id. at 634-35.

E.04, at E-162.
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security by the original plaintiff if this triggered the applicability of
Rule 50. That construction could clearly have deprived poor litigants of an opportunity to pursue a maritime claim since they might
find themselves compelled to post security beyond their means to
obtain even if they elected to proceed in personam without writ of
attachment. Imposition of Rule E(7) obligations today cannot have
so preclusive an effect since the seaman, as a result of the Court's
decision in Washington-Southern, can proceed in personam within
the admiralty jurisdiction, without suffering a similar fate. Nonetheless, application of the Rule E(7) obligation to provide security
for counterclaims could effectively preclude many of the persons
who are most in need of the admiralty's far reaching arrest and
attachment procedures from taking advantage of them. It is apparent that seamen on foreign vessels asserting wage claims or claims
for personal injuries outside the ambit of the Jones Act will often
be compelled to proceed in rem or by attachment in order to avoid
the expense of pursuing the vessel or its owners to a distant port.
Even if the seaman could afford this expenditure, it would often
equal or exceed the numerous small claims that seamen are prone
to have, such as claims for unpaid wages. And, should seamen thus
forced to proceed by way of arrest or attachment be compelled to
post bond for counterclaims that are alleged to have arisen out of
the contract of employment giving rise to their original claims as a
condition precedent to proceeding with the original claim, they
could be effectively deterred from asserting what may be just and
well founded claims. 59 It is unlikely that the Supreme Court, in
59. Some courts have already set up an effective economic barrier to such claims by
compelling seamen to pre-pay the costs of keeping the arrested or attached property. Other
courts, recognizing the deterrent effect this has on a seaman's ability to take advantage of
procedures ostensibly aimed toward providing him with an added measure of protection, have
exempted seamen from a duty to pre-pay such costs. See 7A MOORE & PELAEZ E.04, at E151.
If Supplemental Rule E(7) is deemed applicable to seamen who are often compelled by
economic necessity to pursue wage and similar small claims by commencement of in rem or
quasi in rem actions, it could precipitate the practice of a defendant or claimant asserting
tenuous or even sham counterclaims in the hope that the seaman will be unable to procure
bonding sufficient to answer the counterclaim and, as a consequence, be estopped from
pursuing his original claim. Courts, exercising their discretion in this area, have not been
unwilling to look behind the complaint to ascertain whether there is in fact merit to the
counterclaim before compelling security to be posted. See Morse Ironworks & Dry Dock Co.
v. Luckenbach, 123 F. 332, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1903): "From the pleadings and the affidavits filed
here, I regard it as doubtful if the cross-libelant has any claim upon which he can recover an
affirmative judgment. . . . I am convinced that it would be unjust to apply the rule here."
That approach is commendable, and should continue to be followed where there is suspicion
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promulgating Supplemental Rule E(7), intended any more to work
such a result than it intended by enacting Rule 50 to effectively
preclude seamen from prosecuting their claims in admiralty. Thus,
Justice Brandeis' opinion in Washington-Southern provides strong
justification for excusing seamen from the Rule E(7) duty to post
security for counterclaims.
What is true of seamen, is true also of poor persons, regardless of
whether they happen to be seamen. Economic inability is not sufficient to prevent a maritime claimant from defending an in rem or
quasi in rem claim, although it can prevent him from immediately
securing the release of his vessel. Similarly, poverty should not be
condoned as a basis for preventing a person from using the maritime
procedures of arrest and attachments where those procedures are
appropriate. The better reasoned view is clearly that "it is within
the court's discretion to relieve the original libellant from his obligation to post security where that libellant is shown to be insolvent."' ' "
There is no reason whatsoever to believe that the Supplemental
Rules intended to alter that benevolent approach.
RECEIVERS

Cases involving seamen and poor persons are not the only cases
causing troublesome discussions of whether security on the counterclaim can be compelled. In Zubrod v. Associated Metals & Minerals
Trade Co.,"'the plaintiffs, who were appointed receivers in an admiralty action to foreclose a preferred ship mortgage, proceeded by
way of maritime attachment to recover monies allegedly due under
the terms of a charter party they entered into with defendant. The
defendant posted security to obtain the release of its attached property and counterclaimed for damage arising out of the transaction.
The plaintiff-receivers contended that the fact they had posted a
receiver's bond relieved them from the further duty to provide Rule
50 security. The court was not persuaded by the argument. It said:
The operations of ships, even those in receivership, should not
be immune from one of the normal incidents of such operathat the counterclaim has been asserted only to harass the original plaintiff or to throw an
unwarranted economic burden in his path.
60. Geotas Compania De Vapores, S.A. v. S.S. Aire H., 237 F. Supp. 908, 910 (E.D. Pa.
1964).
61. 243 F. Supp. 340 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
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tions, namely, claims for damage, shortage and loss. Moreover,
it is not at all clear that the receiver's bond posted in Virginia
would by its terms provide security to respondents here for the
damages asserted in the cross-libel. Accordingly, the court considers that a proper exercise of its discretion here calls for the
granting of respondents' motion for security. 2
Had the receiver's bond been sufficient to provide the cross-libellant
with adequate security for any judgment it might have obtained, the
imposition of a duty to provide yet additional security in the jurisdiction where the suit was commenced would be difficult to justify
and would seem to transcend the goal of providing the parties with
an equal degree of security. 3 Indeed, even if the receiver's bond does
not provide the same type of security as a bond in an in rem action,
which unlike virtually all receivers bonds, can be proceeded against
to satisfy the judgment, it is difficult to justify use of the receiver's
assets which are held for the benefit of all creditors to place the
counterclaimant in a position superior even to that of secured creditors, at least where his claim is not one that could otherwise have
62. Id. at 341.
63. It is, of course, unlikely that any receiver's bond can be proceeded against to satisfy
a judgment against the bankrupt estate. Thus, such bonds do not provide the same security
as maritime bonds which, in ordinary circumstances and when provided to secure the release
of an arrested or attached res, provide security for any judgment that may be rendered. See
generally 7A MOORE & PELAEZ E.13, at E-601. However, since most counterclaiming defendants are not seeking to execute maritime liens, there is a good argument against providing
them with the added security that is an inherent part of a maritime bond or stipulation. See
The Transit, 210 F. 575, 576 (E.D. Pa. 1914), where the court dispensed with the plaintiff's
duty to provide a bond where the counterclaim came within the scope of the Bankruptcy Act.
The court said: "If judgment is rendered in favor of the cross-libelant not in excess of judgment in favor of the libelant, a bond in the present case would be superfluous. If he recovers
judgment for an excess, he can receive upon that judgment only such amount as is awarded
him upon proving his claim in the court of bankruptcy. It must be presumed that the receiver
has given bond under the Bankruptcy Act for all assets in his hands, and if in this proceeding
he should be succeeded by a trustee, the cross-libelant will be protectd by the trustee's bond,
and, whether the claim should be determined to entitle the cross-libelant to a priority or to a
dividend with other creditors, recourse can only be had to the funds of the bankrupt estate,
or to the bond of the receiver or trustee."
But see Central American Shipping & Trading Corp. v. Mercantile Ship Repair Co., 73 F.
Supp. 779, 781 (E.D.N.Y. 1947): "There remains the question of the impact of Mercantile's
petition for an arrangement [under the Bankruptcy Act] upon the admiralty proceeding.
There is no proof that Mercantile is insolvent. But, even if there were, it would be manifest
injustice to permit an insolvent libelant to proceed in rem against a valuable property, and
then to keep the security and still deprive the respondent of the protection of General Admiralty Rule 50, because of the libelant's own inability to furnish security. This is the very
technique that the rule was designed to prevent." (bracketed material added).
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achieved that status. It would seem that, at least in absence of
evidence that the receivers used the in rem or quasi in rem maritime
procedures to unduly harrass the defendant, cases of this type would
provide an excellent opportunity for the court to exercise its discretion to deny the need for security on the counterclaim. For an illustration of a court exercising its discretion to deny security on a
counterclaim where it might technically have been compelled, reference is made to South CarolinaState Highway Department v. The
Fort Fetterman."'There, although the plaintiff-state contended that
it had no authority to procure the bond demanded by the crosslibellant, the court refused to decide that issue and said instead:
I am inclined to the view that, . . the shipowner will not
suffer any injury because of the failure of the Highway Department, an agency of the State, to give such bond. The State of
South Carolina will, no doubt, carry out its obligation and
provide for the payment of any judgment that may be awarded
against it in this proceeding. It is inconceivable that the State,
through its agency and its attorney general would come into
Court and seek justice therein, and that it would refuse to do
justice and to comply with the judgment of this Court if it
should adjudge that the State sustained no damage as a result
of the negligence of the shipowner, but that the shipowner suffered damage as a result of the negligence of the State's
agency. 5
Similarly, it is unlikely that bonded receivers and trustees in bankruptcy will fail to make those payments on judgments required by
the laws under which they have been certified, or that the court
would refuse to offset any judgment in the owner's favor against a
judgment received by the plaintiff in the original suit arising out of
the same transaction or occurrence. That this may result in the
counterclaimant being somewhat less secure than would be the case
had the original plaintiff been someone other than a receiver does
not seem sufficient cause to sanction a procedure which would compel the receiver to use assets he holds for the benefit of all creditors
to enhance the position of only one of those creditors."
64.
65.
66.
is not

148 F. Supp. 620 (E.D.S.C. 1956), affl'd, 242 F.2d 799 (4th Cir. 1957).
Id. at 624-25.
The argument is all the more persuasive in those instances where the counterclaimant
seeking to enforce a maritime lien, but has only an in personam claim against the
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SUITS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES

Supplemental Rule E(7) differs from its superseded predecessors
in that it specifically provides that
When the United States or a corporate instrumentality thereof
as defendant is relieved by law of the requirement of giving
security to respond in damages it shall nevertheless be treated
for the purposes of this subdivision E(7) as if it had given such
security if a private person so situated would have been required to give it. 7
The Advisory Committee's Note makes clear that this was intended
to compel a plaintiff in a suit against the United States to post
security to respond to the government's counterclaim when the original action is commenced pursuant to either the Suits in Admiralty
Act or the Public Vessels Act. 8 In this regard, the Supplemental
Rule effects a significant change from the prior practice since, before
1966, the weight of authority was that the respondent to the government's counterclaim in an action originally brought pursuant to the
Suits in Admiralty Act could not be compelled to post security of
any kind."'
Suits against the United States arising out of its operation of
merchant vessels are governed by the Suits in Admiralty Act 1' That
Act permits only suits in personam to be brought against the government. Where the cause of action arises out of the "public" functions of the United States - as would be the case where the action
is against a naval vessel - suit must be commenced under the
Public Vessels Act.7' There too, the original action against the
United States must be in personam within the admiralty jurisdiction. There are other claims that can be made against the government arising out of maritime matters and transactions and which
are beyond the scope of either the Suits in Admiralty Act or the
Public Vessels Act, and often these can be commenced pursuant to
original plaintiff. In such cases, but for the fortuitous circumstance that the in personam
claim was asserted in a suit originally commenced by the arrest or attachment of his property,
the counterclaimant would not be entitled to security or to an enhanced position vis-a-vis
other creditors.
67. 7A MOORE & PELAEZ I E.01[1], at E-5.
68. Id. E.0112], at E-8.
69. See text accompanying notes 72-79 infra.
70. 41 Stat. 525-528, 46 U.S.C. § § 741-752.
71. 43 Stat. 1112-1113, 46 U.S.C. § § 781-790.
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the more general statutes providing for suits against the United
States, such as the Federal Torts Claims Act and the Tucker Act.
The types of suits which could initially have been brought in rem,
however, and which thus raise Supplemental Rule E(7) problems,
are largely, if not entirely, embraced within the scope of the Suits
in Admiralty Act and the Public Vessels Act. And, it is those Acts
to which Supplemental Rule E(7) undoubtedly applies.
In demanding security for a counterclaim the United States is
standing in a most different position from all other maritime defendants seeking the same type of security, since its vessels cannot be
arrested or attached, and thus it can never be compelled to provide
security to obtain the release of its vessels.-This contrasts sharply
with a non-government defendant seeking security on a counterclaim who has been required to provide security to obtain the release
of his arrested or attached property; or who, at the very least, is
being deprived of the use of that property as a result of its seizure
or arrest even though no bond has been posted. Thus, the United
States as a defendant seems more analogous to a defendant in an
ordinary in personam maritime cause without writ of attachment.
It is clear beyond doubt that such defendants are not ordinarily
entitled to security on counterclaims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence as the original suit. Indeed, most preunification decisions dealing with government counterclaims to an
action commenced under the Suits in Admiralty Act provide that
the respondent on the counterclaim need not post security therefor.
This is illustrated by The Winneconne" where an action under the
Suits in Admiralty Act was commenced against the United States
and the latter counterclaimed for damages exceeding those sought
in the original suit, and, in addition, moved to stay the original
action pending the posting of security adequate to answer the counterclaim. The court noted that the original suit was in personam and
that, in such instances, security is never required of the respondent
to the counterclaim. On such facts, the court said: "I can see no
distinction between the United States as a suitor and a private
73
'
individual in a case of this kind.
72. 1923 AMC 428 (E.D. La. 1923). But see George M. Morrell Co. v. S.S. Asquam, 1924
AMC 182 (E.D.N.Y. 1923), where the court ordered the original plaintiff to post security to
answer the United States' cross-libel filed both in personam and in rem; and United States
v. Kroeger, 1933 AMC 687 (E.D.N.Y. 1933).
73. Id.at 430.
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In Eastern Transportation Co. v. United States" the plaintiff
commenced an action against the United States in which it asserted
that it "elects to have this cause proceed in accordance with principles of libel in rem and desires also to seek relief in personam." 15 The
United States filed a cross-libel for which it sought Rule 50 security.
The government contended that
[Slince the libellant elected to proceed as "in rem", the libel
should be regarded as an "in rem" suit; and that since vessels
of the United States are exempt from seizure, the credit of the
United States is substituted for the vessel. Therefore . . .the
proceedings should be regarded "just as if the vessel had, in
fact, been seized and claimed by the United States and re'
76
leased on bond.
The court was not swayed by the government's argument, noting
that the action was obviously premised on the Suits in Admiralty
Act and that Act, regardless of the plaintiff's averments, does not
authorize suits in rem to be commenced against the government. As
to the contention that the solvency of the government and its ability
to pay any judgment that might be rendered against it is equal at
least to the security provided by the posting of a bond, the court
said: "[Tlhe most that can be said for the Government's contention here that the credit of the United States is the equivalent of a
bond given by a private person, is that it is given voluntarily of the
Government's own motion and without compulsion of any court
process."'7 Thus the court concluded:
In coming into court to assert a claim by way of a cross-libel,
the United States takes the position of a private suitor, and
must be treated in the same manner as a private litigant. Since
the voluntary giving of security by a private person, who is the
respondent in the main libel and the libellant in the cross-libel,
does not empower the court to stay proceedings in the main
action until the original libellant shall have given security in
the cross-libel, there is no power in the court to grant a stay
7
under Rule 50 on behalf of the Government here. 1
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

98 F. Supp. 36 (E.D.N.Y. 1951).
Id. at 37.
Id. at 37-38.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 38-39.
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The reasoning of the above decisions was accepted by the court
in Motorlines, Ltd. v. United States.79 There, however, the action
against the United States was premised upon the Public Vessels
Act. That Act, in a section dealing with cross-libels, specifically
provides that
[Wihenever a cross libel is filed for any cause of action for
which the original libel is filed by authority of sections 781-790
of this title, the respondent in the cross libel shall give security
in the usual amount and form to respond to the claim set forth
in said cross libel unless the court, for cause shown, shall otherwise direct; and all proceedings on the original libel shall be
stayed until such security shall be given.80
The court thought that language, coupled with its legislative history,"' was clearly intended to compel the original plaintiff to post
security to answer the government's cross-libel even though the government had not first been compelled to provide security to obtain
the release of its vessel. In reaching this conclusion, however, the
Court made it eminently clear that the requirement of posting security on the government's cross-libels was limited to cross-libels in
actions originally brought pursuant to the Public Vessels Act and
that such a requirement could not be imposed upon a crossrespondent who had originally proceeded under the Suits in Admiralty Act. It said:
Section 783 applies only in those particular situations described in the proviso where the Government files a cross-libel
against the original libelant whose action was brought under
favor of Sections 781-790, Chapter 22 of Title 46. Section 783
does not apply in cases where the Government may file a crosslibel under Sections 741-752, Chapter 20 of Title 46. Nor does
Section 783 apply in libels between private owners of ships or
private persons. In all such cases Rule 50 governs as to a crosslibelant's right to demand security of the original libelant. 2
79. 215 F. Supp. 345 (N.D. Ohio 1963).
80. 46 U.S.C. § 783. The quoted language is contained in a proviso appended to a sentence
making clear that counterclaims can be asserted against the United States in maritime
actions commenced by it. Although the proviso seems out of context, it does seem clearly to
provide for the posting of security to answer government counterclaims in actions commenced
by non-government persons and entities.
81. See 215 F. Supp. at 349-50 for the legislative history the court deemed persuasive.
82. Id. at 350.
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Thus, the Supplemental Rule quite obviously attempts to bridge
the different treatment to which cross-respondents in actions under
the two Acts were previously subjected by uniformly imposing upon
them a duty of providing the government with security on counterclaims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence giving rise
to the original suit. There is no logical reason why a plaintiff proceeding pursuant to the Suits in Admiralty Act should be in any
more favorable a position than a plaintiff proceeding pursuant to
the Public Vessel Act and, in that regard, coalescence of the procedures applicable to both such causes of action is sound. However,
the practical effect of the new rule is to take away from virtually all
maritime claimants asserting a cause of action against the government the opportunity of proceeding in a manner that may not compel them to provide security for any counterclaim arising out of the
same transaction or occurrence that might be asserted. This is particularly significant since the original suit might well, even had the
government not been the defendant, be one that could have been
prosecuted entirely in personam by the plaintiff and thus foreclosed
any likelihood that its continuance could be premised upon the
plaintiff's willingness or ability to post security for any counterclaims that might be brought; or, indeed, it might be a claim that
could only have been commenced in personam even if the defendant
were someone other than the United States.13 Thus, plaintiffs in a
large number of maritime suits against the United States may find
themselves in precisely the uncomfortable position the Supreme
Court found untenable in Washington-Southern Navigation" i.e., they will be deprived of an opportunity to prosecute their claims
in admiralty unless they are affluent enough to post a bond sufficient to answer the government's counterclaim or can persuade the
83. If the claim, although maritime in nature, is one that could only have been commenced in personam, it is arguable that the provisions in the Public Vessels Act requiring the
posting of security to answer the government's counterclaim are not applicable. While 46
U.S.C. § 783 seems broad enough to compel the posting of security in such instances, no
decision extends it that far. Moreover, Supplemental Rule E(7) is limited to situations where
the United States, were it a private party, would have been required to provide security. A
private party sued in an in personam action commenced without attachment cannot be
compelled to provide such security. In related actions under the Suits in Admiralty Act,
Congress specifically provided that the United States "is to have its procedural rights determined and governed in the same manner as private parties." United States v. Isthmian
Steamship Co., 359 U.S. at 324. While the Public Vessels Act does not expressly so provide,
there is no clear indication that Congress was desirous of placing so onerous a burden on
maritime claimants having no in rem rights. But see the discussion in note 85 infra.
84. See note 23 supra.
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court that their poverty is adequate cause for dispensing with the
bond requirement. Indeed, the position of such plaintiffs could be
even worse than that of the plaintiffs in the Washington-Southern
case since a plaintiff with a claim against the government cannot
- as those plaintiffs might have done - elect to proceed in a state
court pursuant to the Saving to Suitors clause, and thus avoid the
impact of the costly admiralty procedures. Such plaintiffs may thus
have no feasible way of avoiding the potential expense of having to
post security to answer a counterclaim arising out of the same transaction or occurrence giving rise to the original suit. Thus, in this
narrow instance, Supplemental Rule E(7) - if given the broad latitude its drafter's seem to have intended - may be at odds with the
position previously taken by the Court in an analogous situation.
While the Congress may be responsible for a portion of this apparent
contradiction, the Court itself is responsible for extension of the
situation to the Suits in Admiralty Act. It is hoped that, because of
the potential dilemma in which this places impecunious plaintiffs
and many seamen, the discretion all courts have to suspend the
security requirement in counterclaim situations will be liberally
exercised. 5
85. It should be pointed out that the Rule compelling plaintiffs to post security to government counterclaims is limited to those situations where the government, were it a private
person, would have been required to post security to obtain the release of its property. This
could be interpreted as meaning that a government counterclaim to a suit brought pursuant
to the Suits in Admiralty Act to enforce a claim that could never have risen to the status of
a maritime lien is outside the scope of Rule E(7); and, that a maritime lien claimant setting
forth averments in a suit brought pursuant to the Suits in Admiralty Act that makes clear
the pleader's purpose is not to execute upon an otherwise available maritime lien but is only
to assert the equally available in personam claim the same offense invariably provides will
also succeed in bringing the cause beyond the scope of Rule E(7). In neither instance could
the property of a private defendant capable of being found within the district have been
arrested or attached and thus no security could have been compelled as a condition precedent
to answering such a defendant's counterclaim.
The problem with the latter argument is that all suits brought pursuant to the Suits in
Admiralty Act must be in personam, and thus the only plaintiffs who might find themselves
compelled to post Rule E(7) security to respond to the government counterclaim would be
those unfortunate few who are too lacking in sophistication to clearly label what must in fact
be an in personam claim as being such. It is unlikely that the Rule intended to impose so
onerous a burden for ignorance in pleading. And, exempting parties with actions within the
scope of the Suits in Admiralty Act which are not of a type that would normally provide the
plaintiff with a maritime lien from a duty to post security to respond to the government's
counterclaim runs the risk of creating the identical disparity of obligation for suitors proceeding under that Act and those proceeding pursuant to the Public Vessels Act the drafter's
specifically sought to eliminate, since the Public Vessels Act can be interpreted as requiring
security regardless of whether the original suit could have been brought in rem or quasi in
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While it is clear that the government cannot be sued in rem or
quasi in rem, it is not absolutely clear if the United States can be
compelled to provide security to-answer counterclaims to its suits
commenced by maritime arrest or attachment."6 In The Gloria,7 a
cross-libel was filed by the owner of a vessel sued in rem by the
United States for damages arising out of a collision between the
defendant's vessel and a vessel in the possession of the United
States. The cross-libelant requested that the United States' action
be stayed pending the posting of security to answer the cross-libel,
and that motion was granted. However, the Court noted that the
case was one "inwhich the respondent or claimant in the principal
cause
at best a very doubtful claim against the libelant in personam,has
but a perfectly
good claim against the ship, if he could only
arrest her.

'ss

In such a case, the inability to arrest the offending

vessel greatly reduces the counter-claiming respondent's ability to
enforce what may well be a legitimate claim arising out of the same
rem were the defendant someone other than the government. That this interpretation is not
the only possible interpretation of the language, however, is discussed at note 83 supra.
It is, thus, not inconceivable that plaintiffs subject to government counterclaims are now
in a somewhat inferior position to those proceeding against private parties in that they may
be called upon to post security to answer all claims arising out of the transaction or occurrence giving rise to the original suit, and they will have to rely upon the court's broad discretion to extricate them from overly burdensome security requirements. Because of the anomalous situation in which persons suing the United States may now find themselves, it is hoped
this discretion will be most liberally exercised. There is scant justification to compel security
on the United States' counterclaim when the original suit is one that could, were the defendant someone less privileged, have been brought in rem. There seems no justification for
compelling such security where the original claim is not to enforce a maritime lien.
86. It must be remembered that the security required by Supplemental Rule E(7) is not
necessarily incident to an in rem or quasi in rem suit, but can at times be demanded even
where the party seeking such security is not entitled to such maritime remedies. See
McCreary, supra note 19, at 40, where the author states: "In reality, the rule [Supplemental
Rule E(7)] bestows on defendant all the fruits of the in rem and attachment remedies even
in situations where neither remedy would be available to him." (emphasis and bracketed
material added). That this "bestowing of fruits" may not be unlimited, however, is indicated
by the discussion in the text following note 46 supra.Thus, the statutory provisions protecting
the United States from suits in rem or quasi in rem are not directly applicable, and Supplemental Rule E(7) does not specifically cover this contingency.
It should be noted that the procedures for asserting a cross-libel or counterclaim against
the United States may be different depending upon whether or not the action arises out of
the same transaction or occurrence. See United States v. MN Pitcairn, 272 F. Supp. 518
(E.D. La. 1967). Because of the two year statute of limitations for such claims, dismissal due
to the selection of an improper procedure can be fatal.
87. 267 F. 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1919).
88. Id. at 930. Of course, the defendant could not arrest the ship since vessels of the United
States are immume from seizure.
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transaction or occurrence as the government's original suit and
equality can ony be achieved if the government is forced to establish
a substitute res from which satisfaction of the counterclaim can be
effectuated or against which the government's claim could be offset.
In the absence of the somewhat unique situation where the defendant's counterclaim is enforceable only in rem, however, it is probable that the financial stability of the government should be sufficient to obviate its need to post security to answer counterclaims
asserted against it in actions it commences by arrest or attach89
ment.
DISPENSATION WITH POSTING OF SECURITY

Supplemental Rule E(7), as was true of its admiralty predecessors, specifically grants the trial court discretion to dispense with
the requirement that the original plaintiff post security to respond
to the defendant's counterclaim.10 This discretion, though undoubtedly broad, is not unlimited. Initially, the duty to post security to
answer the counterclaim can be excused only "for cause shown." 9'
It seems obvious that this burden must be fulfilled by the plaintiff
who is seeking to be relieved of the duty to post security to answer
the defendant's counterclaim, and should not result from action of
92
the court sua sponte based upon its own knowledge or beliefs.
Thus, in the absence of such proof, provided by the original
plaintiff, an order dispensing with the need to post Rule E(7) security would most likely transcend the court's discretion and be subject to reversal. Moreover, it is not altogether clear what type of
inability and inconvenience will be sufficient to fulfill the original
plaintiffs burden. Precedent makes it reasonably clear that the
original plaintiff's insolvency or inability to procure a bond may be
a sufficient basis to trigger application of the court's discretion.
Thus, a widely cited decision provides:
89. For analogous authority, see South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. The Fort Fetterman, 148 F. Supp. 620 (E.D.S.C. 1956), aff'd, 242 F.2d 799 (4th Cir. 1957), and the language
from that decision quoted in the text accompanying note 65 supra. What is said there in
regard to the State of South Carolina seems doubly applicable to the United States.
90. See the text of Supplemental Rule E(7) in 7A Moose & PLAEz
E.01[1]; at E-5.
See id. .30, p. 291, 295 for the text of 1920 Admiralty Rule 50 and 1844 Admiralty Rule 53,
both of which afforded the trial court the same discretion to dispense with the posting of
security to answer cross-libels.
91. Supplemental Rule E(7), 7A Mooam & PsELz E.01[1], at E-5.
92. See The Transit, 210 F. 575 (E.D. Pa. 1914).
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The rule never contemplated, . . that, where the parties to
the original libel had established their rights and obtained security, this should be lost to them, because of their inability,
arising from insolvency or other good reason, to procure a bond
to respond to a large claim asserted in the cross-libel, and that
as a result their libel should be dismissed. This would not only
be unjust, but would in effect negative and nullify the provision
of the rule giving to the trial
court full discretion to act upon
3
.
involved
subject
very
the
Whether economic hardship short of insolvency or inability to procure a bond will suffice to justify an order dispensing with the need
to file an E(7) bond has yet to be judicially resolved. It is not inconceivable, however, that one who is not actually unable to procure a
sufficient bond may be able to do so only by so jeopardizing his
financial position as to risk bankruptcy or the loss of his business
or estate. It would seem that such a showing, supported by credible
evidence, should be deemed the equivalent of "insolvency" and warrant the discretionary dispensing of the duty to post security. There
are, however, no authorities so holding. In any event, it would seem
that the judgment of the trial court in properly94 exercising the
discretion conferred by Supplemental Rule E(7) could be set aside
only for blatant abuses or upon a showing of mistake, fraud or bad
95
faith.
93. The City of Beaumont, 8 F.2d 599, 601 (4th Cir. 1925). The court also said: "The
purpose of the rule was manifestly to place the parties, the libellant and cross-libellant, on
an equality regarding security, as far as the same could be accomplished; but it never meant
to do more than could reasonably and lawfully be done to that end, within the discretion of
the court, under carefully prepared rules prescribing the rights of the parties litigant and
seeking to safeguard and preserve the same."
For other cases holding that the cross-respondent's bond could be dispensed with where
that party is unable to furnish a bond, see Spriggs. v. Hoffstot, 240 F.2d 76, 79 (4th Cir. 1957);
Flota Maritima Browning De Cuba, Sociedad Anonima v. Motor Vessed Ciudad De La
Habana, 245 F. Supp. 205, 209 (D. Md. 1965), aff'd, 363 F.2d 733 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 837 (1966); and Geotas Compania De Vapores, S.A. v. S.S. Arie H., 237 F. Supp.
908, 910 (E.D. Pa. 1964). But see Seaboard & Caribbean Transport Corp. v. HafenDampfschiffahrt A.G. Hapag-Hadac Seebaderdienst, 329 F.2d 538 (5th Cir. 1964).
The ability of the court to excuse an impecunious cross-respondent from fulfilling the duty
to post security to answer the counterclaim asserted against him illustrates the difference
between such a bond and a bond posted to secure the release of arrested or attached property.
The claimant or defendant's insolvency or inability to procure a release bond can never justify
releasing the arrested or attached property.
94. See text accompanying note 91 supra, indicating there are limits to the scope of
discretion the trial court may properly exercise. An exercise of discretion in such areas, no
matter how substantively sound, might well be improper and subject to reversal.
95. That factors other than the cross-respondent's financial condition or his inability to
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procure a bond may occasionally justify dispensing with a Rule E(7) bond is illustrated by
Flota Maritima Browning De Cuba, Sociedad Anonima v. Motor Vessel Ciudad De La Habana, 245 F. Supp. 205 (D. Md. 1965), aff'd, 363 F.2d 733 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
837 (1966). There the court noted that the original defendant's long delay in demanding
security on its cross-libel might be sufficient cause to justify denial of that request. See the
analogous authority in Gypsum Carrier, Inc. v. Handelsman, 307 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1962).
The Flota Maritima Browning court also noted that the counterclaim was not asserted by
the owner of the arrested vessel, who was itself a defendant in the action, but by the Republic
of Cuba which did not own the vessel and thus could not be compelled to post security for
its release. The court said that "In another case that fact alone might be controlling, but in
this case claimant. . . owns respondent . . . and, in view of the ultimate decision herein, it
is not necessary to base any conclusions on the fact that the vessel is not owned by respondent." Id. at 209.
The Flota Maritima Browning court was also concerned that the original defendant which did not release the vessel on bond - had claimed, and was continuing to claim,
sovereign immunity. That, too, in the opinion of the court militated against compelling the
posting of counter security since, if the sovereign immunity issue was ultimately decided in
favor of the original defendant, there would be an imbalance of security in favor of the
immune defendant.
Finally, the court in Flora MaritimaBrowning thought release of the vessel for the original
defendant's failure to post security would be inappropriate because of the presence of intervening libellants who could not be compelled to post security to answer counterclaims asserted against the original defendant and would lose what security they had and, perhaps,
the jurisdictional basis of their claims if the vessel was released.
Thus, even though there was no showing that the cross-respondent was insolvent or unable
to procure a bond, the court excused it from a duty of providing security to answer the original
defendant's counterclaim.
Other authorities make it clear that the court may refuse to compel Rule E(7) security when
the counterclaim is patently frivolous, greatly exaggerated or extremely tenuous. See Spriggs
v. Hoffstot, 240 F.2d 76 (4th Cir. 1957); Morse Ironworks & Dry Dock Co. v. Luckenbach,
123 F. 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1903); and Empresa Maritima A. Vapor v. North & South American
Steam Navigation Co., 16 F. 502, 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1883), where the court said:
It is urged that the fifty-third rule places it in the power of the owner of the vessel
arrested to embarrass the libelants through the assertion of large, fictitious, or unfounded claims in the cross-action, and thus require very large security or a stay of
the libelants' suit. The rule itself furnishes a sufficient answer to this objection, in the
discretion which it allows to the court in requiring security. If the counter-claim be
unfounded, fictitious, or grossly exaggerated, it is for the respondents in the suit in
personam to show this to the court upon the motion for security.
See also Wallin v. Keegan, 426 F.2d 1313 (5th Cir. 1970), where the trial court dismissed
the shipowner's counterclaim to a seaman's wage claim and the court of appeals concluded
that the dismissal was not appealable. The defendant contended that the dismissal resulted
from the trial court's erroneous belief that the pendency of the counterclaim would have
compelled the seaman to post a bond to answer the counterclaim. The appellate court noted
that, in such a situation, the defendant "can attempt to convince the trial judge to reconsider
his order and permit the counterclaims to be reinstated without security under Admiralty
Rule E(7). Such reconsideration is certainly within the power of the trial court until the whole
case is disposed of." Id. at 1314.
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EFFECT OF POSTING SECURITY: STAY OF ACTION AND DISPOSITION OF THE
COUNTERCLAIM

Once the court, in exercising its discretion, concludes that there
is no basis to excuse the respondent from posting security to answer
a counterclaim, the Rule provides that "proceedings on the original
claim shall be stayed until such security is given." 96 The full impact
of that phrase is not altogether clear. What if, for example, no
security is ever posted by the original defendant? Must the action
stand in abeyance forever, or can the court in the exercise of its
discretion dismiss the suit so that any posted security can be released or the vessel, if it has not been released on bond in a jurisdiction that treats its retention by the court as the equivalent of posting
security, returned to its owner? And, if dismissal of the suit is eventually permissible, must it be preceded with a delay on the part of
the original plaintiff in procuring the required bond that is akin to
laches or can it be judicially effectuated by a simple failure to timely
comply with the court's edict to post Rule E(7) security?
In Flota Maritime Browning De Cuba, Sociedad Anonima v.
Motor Vessel CiudadDe La Habana,97 the court, although electing
not to do so, indicated it had the discretion to release an arrested
vessel because of the original plaintiff's failure to post security to
answer the claimant's counterclaim." Other decisions cast doubt on
that conclusion. Initially, the admiralty predecessors to Supplemental Rule E(7) were based upon British sources which talked of suspending, not dismissing, the original action until security to answer
the counterclaim has been posted. 9 There is no indication that the
96. 7A Mooa & PLAEz E.01[ 11],at E-5.
97. See note 95 supra for a discussion of the court's reason for refusing to compel the
original plaintiff to post security to answer the claimant's counterclaim.
98. Indicative of the court's belief that it had the power to order the release of the arrested
vessel as a result of the cross-respondent's failure to post security is its statement that:
"Under all the circumstances the Court concludes that it should exercise its discretion against
requiring libellant to post counter-security, and against releasing the vessel to claimant for
lack of such counter-security." 245 F. Supp. at 210.
See also Seaboard & Caribbean Transport Corp. v. Hafen-Dampfschiffahrt A.G. HapagHadac Seebarderdienst, 329 F.2d 538 (5th Cir. 1964), where the court cancelled a bond
substituted for a vessel arrested in an in rem proceeding as a result of the original plaintiff's
failure to post Rule 50 security to answer a cross-libel. The court of appeals held that cancellation of the bond put an end to the in rem aspects of the case and was thus an appealable
final decision.
99. See the discussion in Washington-Southern Navigation Co. v. Baltimore & Philadelphia Steamboat Co., 263 U.S. 629, 637-38 (1923). There the Court reprinted the English Act
which, in part, provided the court with discretion to "suspend the proceedingsin the principal
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present Rule, speaking in terms of staying the original action and
specifically derived from the superseded admiralty rule, was intended to alter the prior practice. Thus, it is significant that the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in a preunification decision, thought improvident an order staying an action until the original plaintiff posted security to answer a crosslibel and further providing that unless such security was forthcoming within fifteen days the vessel should be released from the attachment. In the words of the court, such an order "was improvident
. . because. . . an order for the release of the vessel or a dismissal
of the libel may not be made." 100 The court, perhaps concerned with
the prospect of forever placing such a case in limbo, did go on to
indicate that in unusual situations an order dismissing the action
might be apropriate. It said:
This is not to say, however, that in no event in a case like that
presented in Empresa Maritima, supra, of willful and inexcusable refusal, after full hearing and ample time afforded to obey
the order for security, the court may not, if justice cannot possibly be otherwise done, impose such terms.''
That result seems eminently sound and in keeping with the spirit,
if not the actual letter, of Supplemental Rule E(7). A plaintiff who
is able without undue hardship to procure the requisite security to
satisfy the provisions of Supplemental Rule E(7) and who refuses
to do so' should not be permitted to indefinitely tie up the original
defendant's property or his security. After passage of a reasonable
time the sanction for an unwarranted non-compliance with the
court's directive to post security should be release of the arrested or
attached property and the dismissal of the cause that automatically
flows from that jurisdiction destroying act. 02 It seems evident that
cause, until security has been given to answer judgment in the cross-cause." (emphasis
added).
100. Pan American Shipping Corp. v. Maritima Colombiana Limitada, 193 F.2d 845, 847
(5th Cir. 1952).
101. Id. See also Partenreederei Wallschiff v. The Pioneer, 120 F. Supp. 525, 529 (E.D.
Mich. 1954): "Only where a libelant fails to furnish security and, after submitting to a stay
of proceedings, by prolonged inaction attempts to hold claimant's vessel for an unreasonably
long time, can a court, on claimant's own stipulation, discharge the vessel, upon a clear
showing that claimants are unable to give security to release her."
102. See Empresa Maritima A Vapor v. North & South American Steam Navigation Co.,
16 F. 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1883). There the cross-respondents claimed that they could "at their own
mere option, decline to furnish security, or, at least, delay doing so as long as suits their
convenience, submitting, meantime, to a stay of their proceedings in the suit in rem, but still
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a stay of the plaintiff's action for failure to provide the compelled
security to answer the counterclaim should not prevent movement
of the counterclaim toward eventual trial. Indeed, even should the
plaintiff's action be dismissed as a result of his failure to post the
mandated security, proceedings on the counterclaim should continue, at least where the counterclaim itself is properly within the
jurisdiction of the district court pursuant either to its admiralty
powers or otherwise. Where there is no independent federal jurisdiction over the counterclaim and the original suit, although properly
within the court's admiralty jurisdiction, is dismissed because of the
plaintiff's unwarranted failure to post the requisite Rule E(7) security, the better rule seems to be that the court has the power either
to dispose of the counterclaim on the merits or to decline jurisdic03
tion.
THE EFFECT OF UNIFICATION ON IN REM COUNTERCLAIMS

When the original suit is in rem or quasi in rem there is little
incentive for the defendant to label his counterclaim arising out of
the same transaction or occurrence as being in rem since he will, as
a result of Supplemental Rule E(7), usually receive the security he
desires without having to undergo the costs and inconveniences of
arresting the offending res. Under the prior admiralty practice, however, cross-libels could be asserted either in rem or in personam
regardless of the nature of the original action. In Partenreederei
0 0' the court said:
Wallschiff v. The Pioneer,
retaining the vessel in custody; and it is urged that the court cannot, under the rule, do more
than stay their proceedings if security is not filed." Id. at 504-05. The court thought such an
interpretation would thwart the object of the rule and could not be sustained. It concluded
that "If the court may enforce its order by disallowing a party's claim or defense, it may, as
a punishment for willful default, release a part of his security, especially as this would in time
become worthless." It gave to the original plaintiffs "a reasonable time" to file security to
answer the counterclaim, or suffer the discharge of the arrested res.
103. See Wetherington v. Phillips, 380 F. Supp. 426 (E.D.N.C. 1974), aff'd, 526 F.2d 591
(4th Cir. 1975); and the discussion in 3 J. MOORE. FEDERAL PRACicE $ 13.15[1]. While neither
of those authorities deal with an action originally commenced pursuant to the district court's
maritime jurisdiction, there does not appear to be any reason for handling such cases differently. It is evident, however, that if the district court elects to retain jurisdiction over the
non-maritime compulsory counterclaim which was originally within the court's ancillary
jurisdiction that claim will, if either party has requested, have to be tried to a jury.
104. 120 F. Supp. 525 (E.D. Mich. 1954). Under the former practice, separate process was
necessary to assert a cross-libel, and it could not be asserted as a part of the answer to the
original suit. See the discussion in note 3 supra. Even if a defendant can today assert an in
rem counterclaim, it is most probable that he will have to do so by executing process in a
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[Ciross-libels in personam as well as those in rem have been
recognized for many years, regardless of the nature of the original libel, if the cross-libel arose out of the same cause of action
for which the original libel was filed and if the parties were the
same. 05
There is no indication that unification was intended to alter this
facet of the prior admiralty practice. Thus, unless the incorporation
of Fed. R. Civ. P. 17 into admiralty practice inadvertently effectuated this change,'0 it may well be that the right to file an in rem
counterclaim yet exists where the court has, or is capable of obtaining, jurisdiction of the res. If this is so, it is not inconceivable that
a court might today hold that a defendant to a maritime suit is
compelled by Fed. R. Civ. P 13(a) to assert all causes of action he
may have arising out of the transaction or occurrence giving rise to
the original suit against both the plaintiff and against the plaintiff's
property then situated, or soon likely to be situated, within the
district. There would be no problem if process on an in rem counterclaim is treated as original process and the release of the property
arrested pursuant to the counterclaim governed by the provisions in
Supplemental Rule E(5).107 It is at least arguable, however, that
Supplemental Rule E(5) is applicable only to original process and
that security for property seized pursuant to counterclaims should
be exclusively governed by the provisions of Supplemental Rule
E(7), regardless of whether the counterclaim is asserted in rem or
in personam. Such a construction could cause problems where the
original action is in personam and the defendant has a valid in rem
claim against property of the plaintiff arising out of the same transaction or occurrence. Will, in such an instance, the court retain the
vessel or compel a bond for its release to be posted even though the
counterclaiming defendant has not posted security to answer the
original in personam claim? Or, will the original defendant now
asserting the in rem claim be himself compelled to post security to
manner identical to that used in instituting such actions since arrest of the res is necessary
to confer jurisdiction on the court. See Frontier Acceptance Corp. v. United Freight Forwarding Co., 286 F. Supp. 367 (D.N.J. 1968), and the discussion in note 3 supra.
105. Id. at 528.
106. See the discussion in note 19 supra.
107. Supplemental Rule E(5) makes it clear that arrested maritime property can be
released prior to judgment only if the claimant or owner posts a special or general bond or if
the release is occasioned by consent or stipulation. See the discussion in 7A MOORE & PELAEZ
E.13.
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answer the plaintiff's original claim so that "equality" will be
achieved notwithstanding that claim was strictly in personam and
thus one for which no security can ordinarily be demanded?
The closest analogous authority to these problems is found in
PartenreedereiWallschiff v. The Pioneer.'8 There plaintiff, owner
of the M/V Wallschiff, commenced actions in rem against the
steamer Pioneer and in personam against The Cleveland-Cliffs Iron
Company. However, the Pioneer was never arrested and the only
cause over which the court had jurisdiction was the in personam
action against Cleveland-Cliffs. Cleveland-Cliffs then filed a crosslibel in rem against the MAV Wallschiff, and that vessel was arrested
within the district in which these proceedings had been commenced.
The original plaintiff sought to procure ,the release of its vessel without the posting of security, arguing that it had neither demanded
nor obtained security from the defendant on its original suit and
that security on cross-libels is proper only when the cross-libelant
has itself posted security to procure the release of its property. The
court wisely rejected this contention, noting that release of vessels
arrested in in rem actions could be accomplished only by the posting
of acceptable security and that there was no indication former Admiralty Rule 50 was intended to alter that practice. 109 That conclusion seems eminently sound, especially when it is remembered that
a release of the vessel without substitution of a bond or other security would deprive the court of in rem jurisdiction. Thus, from a
practical standpoint, the interpretation espoused by the plaintiff in
PartenreedereiWallschiff would, if Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a) now makes
it mandatory to assert in rem causes against the plaintiff's property
by way of counterclaim, prevent a court from ever obtaining jurisdiction over such claims whenever the original claim was in personam without writ of attachment. Moreover, the result could not
even be remedied by the defendant's voluntary posting of security
to answer the in personam claim, since security on counterclaims is
required only when the original defendant is compelled to post security to procure the release of his property." 0 To conclude that the
108. See note 104 supra.
109. See 120 F. Supp. at 529-30 where the court said: "Various liberalities have been
introduced into admiralty practice since adoption of the admiralty rules, particularly as to
method of pleading and cross-pleading, but it is the opinion of this court that they do not
dispense with necessity of posting bond or security for value, to obtain release of a ship held
under a warrant of arrest in a proceeding in rem, and certainly Rule 50 cannot be so interpreted."
110. See the discussion in the text accompanying note 23 supra.

1978-79

Security on Admiralty Counterclaims

287

incorporation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a) into admiralty practice has
thus taken away the right of a defendant who has been sued in
personam to proceed in rem to execute a lien arising out of the same
transaction or occurrence is simply not warranted by any reasonable
reading of the rules or the drafter's comments.
However, if the plaintiffs vessel must be released on bond or
remain in the marshal's custody while the defendant who caused
this arrest to occur is permitted to defend the action against him
without posting of any security, we have the same inequality that
Supplemental Rule E(7) and its now superseded admiralty predecessors sought to eliminate. It is reasonably clear that "[a]lthough
one of the purposes of Rule 50 may be to limit the character of
permissible cross-libels, its principalpurpose is to place parties on
an equal basis before trial,insofar as security is concerned.""' There
is no reason to believe that the "principal purpose" of Supplemental
Rule E(7) is any different.
The language of the Rule itself poses a significant barrier to compelling the defendant-counterclaimant to post security or suffer the
stay of his own in rem action, since it provides only that "any
plaintiff for whose benefit such security has been given shall give
security . . . to respond in damages to the claims set forth in such
counterclaim.""' Yet, superseded Admiralty Rule 50 was similarly
worded"' and the court in PartenreedereiWallschiff v. The Pioneer
indicated that, had the original plaintiff whose vessel was arrested
pursuant to the cross-libel requested, it might well have been willing
to bend the language of the Rule to compel the defendantcounterclaimant to post security to protect the original plaintiff.
The court, in what is rather strong dictum, said:
Rule 50 reposes some discretionary power in the court to
grant or deny cross-security in cases warranting exercise of
such discretion. In view of the present more liberal practice in
admiralty, it would seem that the spirit of Rule 50 would not
be violated by allowing cross-securityto libelant, although the
rule specifically refers to a cross-libelant rather than a libelant,
as the one who can demand it. Perhaps the rule has never been
111. Partenreederei Wallschiff v. The Pioneer, 120 F. Supp. 525, 528 (E.D. Mich. 1954)
(emphasis added).
112. 7A MooRE & P_AEZ E.01[11, at E-5.
113. See the text of superseded Admiralty Rule 50 in id. .30, p. 296. which provided for
the giving of security by the original defendant where "the respondent or claimant in the
original suit shall have given security to respond in damages."
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so interpreted because the problem has never been presented
for decision. Since the purpose of the rule is to put the parties
on an equal basis as to security, the court would be inclined to
entertain a request for cross-security. This proceeding, however, is not an application for cross-security but a demand for
release of the ship, without filing bond or stipulation for value.
Libelant has failed to show that it is entitled to such relief."'
Thus, it is not inconceivable that some courts may construe the
discretion embodied in Supplemental Rule E(7), together with the
long-standing admiralty precedents that the purpose of such a provision is to place both parties to a suit that has in rem aspects on
an equal footing insofar as security to answer a judgment is concerned, as a sufficient basis to compel a counterclaiming defendant
who has occasioned the arrest of the original plaintiff's property to
himself post security to answer the initial in personam claim or
suffer the stay of his counterclaim. In the absence of further judicial
clarification or an amendment of the Rule, however, this problem
will remain one of the numerous confused areas carried forward
from the former admiralty practice.
CONCLUSION

The merger of admiralty and civil procedures creates a host of
problems that defy easy resolution. The natural problems of such a
marriage are exacerbated in the areas to which Supplemental Rule
E(7) may apply. Because a definitive resolution of these problems
can be made only by the United States Supreme Court, it is likely
114. 120 F. Supp. at 530. See also Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. McMahon, 235 F.2d
142, 143 (2d Cir. 1956), where the court, in the course of permitting an owner who had
petitioned to limit liability to file cross-libels against administrators of deceased seamen who
had filed claims against the vessel, said: "[Aipproach to modem admiralty as to modem
civil procedure should be to permit convenient practice where we know of no authority that
forbids."
See also Patterson Oil Terminals, Inc. v. The Port Covington, 205 F.2d 694, 698 (3d Cir.
1953), where in a footnote, the court said: "There is no specific provision in the Admiralty
Rules . . . with respect to a cross-libel by one respondent against another. Rule 50 of the
Admiralty Rules, however, requires the posting of security where a respondent cross-libels the
libellant and the practice has been followed where one respondent cross-libels another
respondent." (emphasis added). The statement, unsupported by any authority, seems questionable since the respondent filing the cross-libel has given no security to benefit the other
respondent. The statement is indicative, however, of a seeming judicial discretion to compel
security in situations not specifically covered by the rules.
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that uncertainty and conflict will exist for the foreseeable future and

that the lower federal courts will have to decide the issues raised in
this article without benefit of the Supreme Court's thoughts. It is
hoped that in resolving these issues the lower courts will be guided
by the accomodation of competing interests the admiralty has long
sought to achieve and will resist application of the letter of the Rule
in a manner that is inconsistent with its historical spirit.

